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1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 5th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Wednesday, 19 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

President:	Mr. ZLENKO (Vice-President)	(Ukraine)
later:	Mr. DHANAPALA (President)	(Sri Lanka)

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In the absence of Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), Mr. Zlenko (Ukraine), Vice-President, took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. ZACHARAKIS (Greece) said that he fully supported the statement made by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union. For his part, he would confine himself to emphasizing the importance which his country attached to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and addressing some issues which were of particular interest to Greece.

2. The non-proliferation Treaty was the most important agreement in the history of nuclear disarmament. It had not only prevented the spread of nuclear weapons and promoted technical cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, but had also provided a frame of reference for nuclear disarmament efforts.

3. The steps taken since the previous Review Conference to strengthen nuclear export controls and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards had contributed to global confidence and security, as evidenced by the significant increase in the number of parties to the Treaty, which now numbered almost 180, including the five nuclear Powers. In order to fulfil the expectations thus raised, it was essential to extend the Treaty indefinitely. Any other solution would create uncertainty about the future of the Treaty, deprive it of its credibility and very quickly have a destabilizing effect.

4. In the absence of the non-proliferation Treaty, a number of achievements, including the IAEA safeguards, could fall apart. In that connection, Greece fully subscribed to the position adopted by the European Union at the Corfu summit meeting that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely. European unanimity was all the more remarkable in that the Union was comprised of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. It should also be noted that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe supported the European Union's initiative. Reviewing the arguments of those who were opposed to the indefinite extension of the Treaty, he said that, whatever the modalities agreed upon, such a solution would deprive non-nuclear-weapon States of the possibility of exerting pressure on the nuclear Powers to honour their commitments under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. Indeed, it had been under the pressure exerted within the Review Conferences convened periodically in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, that a reduction in nuclear arsenals had recently been undertaken. The opportunity to exert such pressure would be lost if the Treaty were to expire. Moreover, the nuclear Powers would then be freed of the obligation to disarm which they had undertaken in accordance with article VI. That would have even worse consequences.

5. To extend the non-proliferation Treaty for a limited period would be tantamount to programming its expiration, unless an amendment was envisaged. That would be an extremely complex procedure which, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 2, would have to be supported by the majority of parties

to the Treaty (including all the nuclear-weapon States) or by all the parties to the Treaty which were members of the Board of Governors of IAEA. That cumbersome procedure would be very time-consuming.

6. It should also be pointed out that, in such a situation, it would be difficult for IAEA to plan and finance its safeguards activities, which must be based on long-term projections.

7. Greece was also opposed to the solution whereby the non-proliferation Treaty would be extended for several additional periods, since that would also create uncertainty about the future of the Treaty.

8. Whatever the Treaty's shortcomings, its unconditional and indefinite extension was the only way to ensure that the commitments undertaken with regard to non-proliferation would remain valid. That solution would also ensure the continuation of a forum for debate on issues related to non-proliferation, cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the reduction of nuclear weapons and disarmament. The significant increase in the number of parties to the Treaty also argued in favour of a universal Treaty extended for an indefinite period.

9. With the end of the cold war and the conclusion of treaties calling for drastic reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation, it was at last possible to envisage the attainment of the objectives set out in the non-proliferation Treaty of stemming both vertical and horizontal proliferation. In that connection, Greece supported the various efforts being made at the international level in the field of disarmament: the negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which should soon be achieved; the strengthening of the non-proliferation region and of the safeguards activities of IAEA; the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, particularly in the Middle East; and the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a universal and effectively verifiable treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for weapon purposes. It also welcomed the adoption by consensus of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances and the historic declarations made on that subject by the five nuclear Powers.

10. Whatever its shortcomings, a permanent non-proliferation Treaty would guarantee all parties thereto access to nuclear materials and technology. Greece had contributed towards that goal by providing substantial assistance to various countries and by making voluntary contributions to the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Fund of IAEA.

11. In conclusion, he said that his country, which had been one of the first to sign the Treaty, believed that it should remain a vital framework for the efforts being made in the field of security, arms reduction and disarmament and that its unconditional and indefinite extension would promote economic and social development throughout the world.

12. Mr. WYZNER (Poland), referring to the political transformations which had taken place in his country and in Europe since the previous Review Conference, welcomed the fact that they had been accompanied by a renewal of the commitments

undertaken in the cause of non-proliferation. In particular, he welcomed the fact that Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania had acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty and that, like Poland and the 52 States members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, they were in favour of the unconditional and indefinite extension of the Treaty. In that connection, Poland shared the views expressed by the representative of France, speaking on behalf of the European Union and the associated States of Central and Eastern Europe.

13. On other continents, the non-proliferation regime was also being strengthened. In Latin America, initiatives had been taken by Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and the Treaty of Tlatelolco had recently been signed by Cuba. In Africa, with South Africa's accession to the non-proliferation Treaty, there was now a prospect of the continent becoming denuclearized. Those successes and the fact that the Treaty had now become an almost universal instrument should not obscure the fact that a number of important States still remained outside it. Poland would be prepared to join with others in exploring ways of encouraging them to accede to the Treaty.

14. From that perspective, he reviewed the merits of the Treaty and emphasized that they included not only the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but also nuclear disarmament.

15. In that connection, he welcomed the important advances made in nuclear disarmament and noted that article VI was being implemented. Following the accession of Ukraine to the non-proliferation Treaty, the START I Treaty had entered into force, paving the way for the early ratification and implementation of the START II Treaty. That would open up prospects for further reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation and, perhaps, of other nuclear Powers, too. The multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty were also going well and testified to the resolve of the five nuclear Powers to stand by the commitments they had made under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. It was to be hoped that, before the 1995 session was over, the Conference on Disarmament would have been able to elaborate a draft treaty that was acceptable to all parties to the negotiations. The draft must be not only comprehensive but specific, and it must prohibit all nuclear tests, everywhere and for all time, and leave no loopholes whatsoever. It was imperative that it should be adopted for an indefinite duration.

16. The elaboration of a treaty on the prohibition of the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapon purposes and other explosive devices was also going well. There were therefore many reasons to welcome the progress achieved in the implementation of article VI and to emphasize that the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty would lead to further advances in disarmament.

17. That solution would also open up broad prospects for trade cooperation and assistance in all areas of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, in particular the nuclear power industry. Suppliers must be confident that nuclear trade and cooperation would continue to take place within the framework of the safeguards provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty. When those prerequisites were met, the recipient States parties, in other words the nuclear have-nots, should be assured of their right of access to peaceful nuclear technology in accordance

with article IV of the Treaty. Poland, which was also at the receiving end of technical cooperation and assistance in the civilian nuclear field and, to the extent of its possibilities, rendered assistance to others, was vitally interested in enhancing such cooperation. It greatly appreciated the role played by IAEA in that connection, and hoped that it would be strengthened.

18. Turning to the question of the safeguard provisions contained in article III of the non-proliferation Treaty he said that in view of recent instances of non-compliance with the Treaty, the need to assure sustained credibility and effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards had become evident. Accordingly, Poland was in favour of prompt implementation of the measures considered by IAEA in the context of the "programme 93 + 2" and it was ready to participate in the necessary work.

19. While speaking about IAEA safeguards he wished to commend the Agency on the considerable work it had accomplished since the last review conference: numerous inspections (including Iraq and in South Africa), verification of the quadripartite agreement on the implementation of safeguards in Argentina and Brazil, negotiation of safeguards agreements with the newly independent States of the former Soviet Union and provision of assistance with a view to giving effect to those agreements.

20. The Agency also deserved to be congratulated for its perseverance in endeavouring to ensure full implementation of the safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. He noted with satisfaction that IAEA was reporting cases of non-compliance to the Security Council as required by the IAEA statute and that the Council was taking vigorous action in the known cases of non-compliance with a Treaty.

21. It had been decided at the 1990 Review Conference that, in order to be able to receive nuclear supplies, non-nuclear-weapon States would have to agree to full-scope safeguards. That decision had been followed by a consensus decision of the States of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group. As a result, in order to be able to receive nuclear supplies, a non-nuclear-weapon State must either be a party to the Treaty or have concluded full-scope safeguards agreements with IAEA.

22. Unlike many other States, Poland believed that export control measures whether agreed upon within the Zangger Committee or the Nuclear Suppliers' Group, including those concerning dual-use nuclear items, were motivated by principles of non-discrimination and that they served international trade and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

23. Turning to the issue of security assurances which it was legitimate to give to non-nuclear-weapon States, he welcomed the adoption on 11 April 1995 of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the statements made on the subject by each of the nuclear Powers.

24. He was convinced that the Treaty would be extended indefinitely and unconditionally, and expressed the hope that the review mechanism it provided for would be fully used in future to provide for continuous scrutiny and enhancement of the Treaty's implementation.

25. Mr. CONSTANTINESCU (Romania) said that, as a country associated to the European Union, Romania fully endorsed the positions outlined by the presidency of the Union. All nations, both those which had nuclear weapons and those that did not, would stand to benefit from a permanent non-proliferation Treaty. It would be a sign of confidence in the international non-proliferation regime centred around the Treaty. The latter was the foundation for most other arms control agreements and it allowed mankind to enjoy the many benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

26. The main objective of the Treaty, namely, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to foster cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to work for an end of the nuclear arms race and encourage arms control and disarmament, were being met. The Treaty was the only multilateral arms control agreement that required its parties to negotiate nuclear disarmament measures. The fact that in all regions of the world, rival States were renouncing acquiring nuclear weapons presented very obvious security benefits. South Africa's adherence to the Treaty had enhanced the security of all African States. The same was true in Europe, where all States, including the newly independent States of the former Soviet Union, were now parties to the Treaty.

27. Implementation of IAEA safeguards was further evidence of the way in which the Treaty strengthened international security. Safeguards did not, in themselves, encourage non-proliferation, but because of the confidence which effective verification provided, they helped reduce the concerns that potential adversaries might have regarding their own security. It was, therefore, necessary to enhance the system of safeguards, starting with the strengthening of the international inspection procedures carried out by IAEA. The safeguards agreements with IAEA were important security assurances for all countries. It was therefore essential for the Conference to reaffirm that such agreements, which were mandated by the Treaty, were vital prerequisites for the supply of any nuclear material or technology to non-nuclear-weapon States for peaceful purposes. Multilateral coordinating groups, such as the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers' Group or the Missile Technology Control regime, supplemented the efforts of international organizations, which had difficulty tracking the many commercial business deals that sometimes opened the way to dangerous diversions of dual-use nuclear equipment. Participation in those groups should be strengthened and their effectiveness enhanced.

28. With regard to the future of the nuclear disarmament process, the Conference should take into account and reaffirm the importance of four main tracks: Firstly, there was a need to continue and accelerate the process of nuclear disarmament of the nuclear-weapon States. Secondly, a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty should be concluded; that might be possible in the near future. Thirdly, the multilateral negotiations on a future convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive devices recently launched at the Conference on disarmament must be pursued. Finally, further enhancement of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime would be best served by the elaboration of international arrangements to strengthen the security of non-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the individual statements on the subject made by the five nuclear-weapon States constituted an important step towards a suitable solution.

29. Romania urged all countries which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty; all Parties should do their utmost to ensure that it was extended unconditionally and indefinitely. To do otherwise would be to undermine the very foundation of the thus-far successful world-wide efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons while making the benefits of peaceful uses of nuclear energy available to mankind. It would endanger the climate of trust prevailing among parties to the Treaty and would weaken their security and their hopes for enhanced nuclear cooperation. Participants in the Conference had a historic opportunity to create a more secure world. It must not be allowed to slip away.

30. Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka) took the Chair.

31. Mr. AGAM (Malaysia) said that his delegation could not help but note the gap that existed between the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty and their actions. The non-nuclear-weapon States, for their part, had fulfilled their commitments, in the hope that the nuclear-weapon States would do likewise. Unfortunately, the latter's nuclear programmes had expanded almost without restraint over the past few decades. The Treaty was neither fair nor just but, in fact, discriminatory: it accorded privileged status to the nuclear-weapon States and prohibited the non-nuclear-weapon States from developing or acquiring such weapons.

32. Malaysia acknowledged the important breakthroughs that had been made in the various disarmament negotiations among all or some of the nuclear-weapon States, which had led to major nuclear disarmament agreements. It was encouraged by the ongoing efforts to reduce nuclear weapons, but regretted that those breakthroughs were limited in scope and disappointing. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty was an essential prerequisite to halting the nuclear arms race, for it would contribute effectively to ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, the nuclear-weapon States which had instituted a moratorium on testing should maintain it and resist the temptation of resuming testing. Malaysia urged the nuclear-weapon State which did not as yet observe the moratorium to join in the voluntary restraint so as to create an atmosphere conducive to successful negotiations of that instrument.

33. Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes was an equally important nuclear non-proliferation measure. His delegation was encouraged by the readiness of the nuclear-weapon States to do so. It hoped that they would spearhead the efforts to draw up a convention banning the production and stockpiling of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

34. In a global security system premised on nuclear deterrence, it was only natural that the non-nuclear-weapon States should harbour feelings of insecurity. The latest effort by the nuclear-weapon States to remedy the situation, which had taken the form of Security Council resolution 984 (1995), together with individual statements on negative security assurances, were too little and too late. It was an obvious attempt by those States to provide a "sweetener" conducive to an indefinite extension of the Treaty rather than a real move to allay the fears of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The nuclear-weapon States parties should set a time-frame for the elimination of all nuclear weapons, provide greater security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States,

and recognize and respect the binding nature of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The States outside the Treaty should become State parties as soon as possible to ensure its universality. However, the Treaty should not be perceived as a system that perpetuated the status quo.

35. One of the more positive developments under the Treaty was the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, as established by the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga. Thanks to the efforts of ASEAN, south-east Asia also should soon have a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It was to be hoped that the treaty being drafted for that purpose would encourage similar trends in other parts of Asia, particularly in the Middle East, and in Africa and Europe.

36. A further positive aspect of the Treaty was the contribution it had made in the area of applications of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Unfortunately, the recently reinstated export control requirements were an impediment to the international exchange of nuclear materials and equipment for peaceful purposes under the Treaty.

37. Malaysia supported the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards regime; however, the legal implications of those measures would need to be studied in greater detail. It should be noted also that the resources for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes through the IAEA Technical Cooperation Fund were in a downward trend. That decline, together with the practice of not giving preferential treatment to States parties over non-parties, meant that only a part of article IV was being implemented. Positive discrimination in favour of States parties would encourage non-parties to accede. Malaysia also expected the monitoring and verification of nuclear materials and activities to be equally applicable to nuclear-weapon States. It therefore welcomed the offer by some nuclear-weapon States to open their peaceful nuclear facilities to IAEA inspection.

38. Despite certain misgivings in connection with the operational aspects of the Treaty, Malaysia was strongly supportive of its extension. It feared, however, that such an extension might permanently divide the world into nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. It would also tend to confer legality on the possession and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Lastly, it would remove for ever the opportunity to utilize the Treaty as a legitimate means of once and for all eliminating nuclear weapons from the face of the earth.

39. For the reasons given, Malaysia found it difficult to support an indefinite extension of the Treaty. Nuclear weapons were immoral and should be declared illegal. Extension of the Treaty should be limited to a fixed period or periods pegged to a schedule of disarmament measures which the nuclear-weapon States must take, leading ultimately to a nuclear-free world. That was not an ideal but rather a specific initiative which could take shape if all the provisions of the Treaty were implemented. Extending the Treaty indefinitely and unconditionally would be a bar to changing the status quo and would mean rejecting once and for all the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

40. Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) said that, from the very beginning of the nuclear era, the need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons had been

overriding. Although the risk of a nuclear holocaust had practically disappeared, the danger of nuclear-weapons proliferation was always present and had even increased. The possibility that some countries might try to acquire nuclear weapons currently added to the danger that unscrupulous elements might traffic in nuclear products without concern for the destabilizing effects on international security. It was therefore of the most critical importance to strengthen further the international non-proliferation system. Accordingly, Venezuela supported without reservation the Treaty and the global non-proliferation system, of which the Treaty of Tlatelolco, establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean, was an essential piece.

41. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was probably one of the most paradoxical international instruments. After the Charter, it was the multilateral instrument which had garnered the support of the largest number of States. It had slowed the spread of nuclear weapons and promoted cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, the Treaty was also the source of deep resentment, because of both the inequalities it perpetuated and the lack of balance with which it was applied. The non-nuclear-weapon States had faithfully fulfilled their obligations. The nuclear Powers, on the other hand, had not fully honoured their commitments to end all nuclear testing, to pursue good-faith disarmament negotiations to halt the nuclear arms race, to stop production of nuclear weapons, to reduce existing arsenals, to dismantle nuclear warheads and their delivery systems and, lastly, to conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

42. It was true that substantial progress had been made in recent years in the context of bilateral agreements between the United States and the Russian Federation: the arms race had virtually ceased and large quantities of nuclear warheads and missiles had been destroyed. Collateral measures had also been taken to slow vertical proliferation. However, it should be noted that those achievements did not result directly from the obligations embodied in the Treaty but were a fortunate effect of the end of the cold war and the trust which had developed between the two nuclear super-Powers. It should not be forgotten, either, that the world currently contained more nuclear weapons than it had in 1970.

43. Venezuela did not underestimate the importance of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on negative and positive security assurances or the accompanying unilateral statements of the nuclear Powers. But, in order not to look like a last-ditch effort, those steps should have been taken earlier. Venezuela shared the Secretary-General's opinion that Council resolution 984 (1995) should go hand in hand with specific measures and be transformed into a legally binding instrument.

44. That was the climate of controversy in which the international community must take action of critical importance in determining the framework for the conduct of future international relations and the future shape of world security. All countries were aware of the dangers of the spread of nuclear weapons and wanted the Treaty to continue to shield them from the monstrous instrument of destruction which nuclear weapons represented. That was why the

greatest care must be taken with the elements on which the decision to extend the Treaty would be based.

45. According to his delegation, those elements were: first, the decision must strengthen the Treaty and facilitate the attainment of its objectives; secondly, it must be the result of a consensus, since if adopted by a small majority or without the support of major and representative countries of the third world, the Treaty, like the non-proliferation system as a whole, would be unavoidably weakened; thirdly, it must be faithful to the spirit and letter of article X, paragraph 2, which stipulated as a prerequisite for extension the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by all the States parties; fourthly, it must maintain the verification machinery consisting of review conferences every five years; fifthly, it must ensure the maintenance of transfers of technology for peaceful purposes provided for in article IV; and, lastly, it must preserve the link between the renewal of the Treaty and the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by the nuclear Powers. The States parties must be able to call the Treaty into question; otherwise, its discriminatory character would be further accentuated.

46. Venezuela intended to submit to the Conference a formal proposal embodying the aforementioned conditions. The proposal would have the effect of extending the Treaty on the same terms and conditions as those on which it had been based originally: it could be extended for further periods of 25 years, it would be the subject of review conferences every five years, and every 25 years a conference of States parties would be convened to decide on its extension. Accordingly, the States parties could, if satisfied with the results obtained in the area of nuclear disarmament, decide to extend the Treaty for an indefinite period. On the other hand, they could opt for one of the formulas provided for in article X, paragraph 2.

47. Venezuela's proposal would not entail any amendment of the Treaty, since it did not alter the current text at all, and it in no way excluded the possibility of convening another extension conference. The decision to extend the Treaty should be accompanied by a firm and solemn commitment on the part of the nuclear Powers to intensify their efforts to fulfil all the obligations they had assumed and to work effectively towards complete disarmament. Such a commitment would help to reduce the discriminatory nature of the Treaty and would have to be embodied in the documents recording the results of the review of the implementation of the Treaty. That valuable instrument could therefore continue to provide a means of pressuring the nuclear Powers to honour fully their commitments and thereby to contribute to the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals.

48. Mr. PARK (Republic of Korea) said it was extremely satisfying to note that the number of States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty continued to increase; he once again urged those countries which had not yet signed the Treaty to do so at the earliest possible date. His country had acceded to the treaty in 1975, had signed a full-scope safeguards agreement with IAEA in the same year and was fully committed to non-proliferation, as could be seen from the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in which it had pledged not only to forego the development, possession and deployment of nuclear weapons, but also to give up reprocessing and enrichment facilities. His country, which was situated in close proximity to two nuclear-

weapon States, a State having a very advanced civilian nuclear programme and North Korea, which had yet to ensure nuclear transparency, was in a uniquely precarious location, especially in the light of the recent serious threat of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. That had not prevented his country from faithfully implementing the provisions of the Treaty and remaining fully committed to preserving its integrity.

49. It was necessary to bolster confidence in the Treaty, which was the only viable and practical means of curbing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to rectify the Treaty's shortcomings, especially those relating to fairness and equity in its implementation. It would be unrealistic to ignore the protests concerning the different treatment accorded to States according to whether or not they possessed nuclear weapons. Only when the legitimate concerns raised by those disparities had been addressed would it be possible to attain fully the objectives of the Treaty with regard to nuclear disarmament, enhance the security of all States parties and foster cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

50. The objectives of the Treaty were interlinked and mutually complementary, and all must be treated with equal weight if the integrity of the Treaty was to be preserved. That had rarely been the case, for although an overwhelming number of non-nuclear-weapon States had cooperated fully in preventing nuclear proliferation, there had been exponential increases in the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States since the Treaty had come into effect and it was only recently that progress towards nuclear disarmament had begun with the conclusion of the intermediate nuclear forces Treaty and the START I and START II treaties. His delegation hoped that those treaties would encourage other States to follow suit and would be implemented promptly and effectively. It urged the nuclear-weapon States to exert further efforts to make major reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

51. It welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and fully supported the ongoing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It also welcomed the moratorium on nuclear testing maintained by the United States, Russia, France and the United Kingdom and hoped that China would join the moratorium soon.

52. It likewise hoped that the negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons would begin soon in Geneva.

53. The best way of addressing the concerns expressed about the transfer of know-how and technology for peaceful uses of nuclear energy would be to make distinctions among States according to their behaviour. For example, preferential treatment should be given to States which had a solid history of honouring the provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty, while strict sanctions should be imposed on those States which had not respected their obligations under that treaty.

54. The IAEA safeguards measures were integral components of the Treaty, whose effectiveness would be enhanced by a strengthening of the IAEA inspection system. His delegation supported the 93 + 2 programme put forward by IAEA, which would strengthen the inspection regime and enhance the transparency of

national nuclear policies. His country attached great importance to the role of the State system of accounting and control of nuclear materials and in April 1994 had even established a technology centre for nuclear control to enhance nuclear transparency. It was convinced that the establishment of similar national inspection systems by other countries could contribute effectively to the work of IAEA and looked to the latter for support in such efforts.

55. With regard to the crisis created recently by North Korea's refusal to comply with its obligations under the Treaty, he said that North Korea's nuclear activities threatened peace and security not only in the Korean peninsula but also in north-east Asia and could have serious implications for the implementation of the IAEA safeguards agreement. His delegation believed that the Agreed Framework concluded on 21 October 1994 in Geneva between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea could solve that problem and invited North Korea to implement faithfully all the provisions of that instrument, to ensure the total transparency of its nuclear programme under the safeguards agreement it had concluded with IAEA, and to comply fully with the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

56. Lastly, his country believed that the Treaty, which was the only global and nuclear non-proliferation treaty and was a basic norm-setting instrument in the field of nuclear non-proliferation, and which had also served as the model for all the major international arms control agreements, was essential to the enhancement of international peace and security and should therefore be extended indefinitely.

57. Mr. SHENK (Slovakia) said he was convinced that the Conference would further the use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes. His delegation fully associated itself with the statement made by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union and the associated countries of Central and Eastern Europe; his country was ready to cooperate actively in the elimination of the most destructive type of weapons of mass destruction.

58. Although Slovakia firmly rejected the use of nuclear weapons, it had a large civilian nuclear programme, of which nuclear power generation was one of the main components; nuclear power plants accounted for about half of the country's total generation of electricity.

59. His country considered that IAEA, with which it enjoyed productive cooperation, made a pivotal contribution to the promotion of international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and played an irreplaceable role in the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty, using its safeguards system to prevent fissile materials from being converted for military purposes. That system was a generally recognized international mechanism whose importance was growing with the increasing number of nuclear installations and had recently proved its usefulness. It could be greatly strengthened by applying it to fissile materials. Furthermore, the progress made in the reduction of nuclear military potential since the most recent Review and Extension Conference promised well for the future.

60. Slovakia adhered strictly to the obligations arising from the applicat. of safeguards to nuclear materials and installations situated in its territory. It supported all measures designed to strengthen the safeguards system and increase its effectiveness. In particular, it endorsed the implementation of advanced methods going beyond currently applied practices (environmental monitoring, expanded right of access to information, "no-notice" inspections, etc.).

61. His country viewed the Treaty as an exceptionally important global mechanism that could play a dominant role in the prevention of nuclear proliferation, reduce the risk of nuclear conflict and promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. An issue inseparable from the nuclear disarmament problem was that of a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the drafting of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. That treaty, which had rightly been the main focus of the discussions at the 1994 Conference on Disarmament and should be again in 1995, should lead to the establishment of an efficient international monitoring system that would make it possible to identify and measure effects related to nuclear explosions. His delegation supported the early drafting, conclusion and entry into force of a treaty ending all nuclear explosions once and for all, without any exception, and considered observance of the nuclear test-ban moratorium to be an important element in the preparation of that text. It welcomed the fact that the Conference on Disarmament had established an ad hoc committee to negotiate a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

62. Slovakia, which did not possess any nuclear weapons and felt threatened by their existence, supported all initiatives in favour of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and had greatly appreciated the coordinated declarations of 6 April 1995 in which the nuclear-weapon States had pledged not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the non-proliferation Treaty and to give immediate assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon State that was the victim of a nuclear attack. Those declarations, like resolution 984 (1995) adopted recently by the Security Council, represented an important element of the security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

63. His country supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty, which it viewed as an important means of guaranteeing international security and strengthening confidence and stability. It welcomed the growing number of accessions to the Treaty, including those of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and South Africa, and the destruction of South Africa's military nuclear potential.

64. Mr. WOLZFELD (Luxembourg) said he endorsed the statement made by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union and the six associated central and eastern European countries and was pleased to note that a very large number of countries had acceded to the Treaty and, in particular, that 173 of the 178 States signatories to the Treaty had renounced the possession of atomic weapons. He also noted that since the entry into force of the Treaty, whose importance and decisive influence was undisputed among the States Parties, the number of nuclear-weapon States had remained practically the same, apart from a

few "threshold" countries which had the capacity to manufacture atomic weapons. It was hard to imagine what the current state of the world would be without the Treaty.

65. He recognized that the situation was far from perfect, and particularly regretted the fact that some 10 countries had not yet decided to accede to the Treaty, that some of them presented a serious problem for the international community because of their ambiguous position regarding nuclear non-proliferation and that several States Parties to the Treaty had not honoured the commitments they had undertaken and had tried to develop nuclear weapons. On the other hand, he noted that the vast majority of countries scrupulously respected the arrangements entered into under the Treaty.

66. Recalling that that Treaty also contained provisions that should facilitate the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, he said that his country had decided against installing the capacity for producing nuclear energy in its territory but none the less benefited from a number of peaceful applications of such energy. Luxembourg, which had acceded to the Treaty 20 years earlier, had always pursued a strict policy of nuclear non-proliferation and, being anxious to prevent sensitive nuclear materials from being used for terrorist activities or nuclear programmes of a non-peaceful nature, had established a solid infrastructure to combat the illicit traffic in such materials, whose transfer it permitted only if it was sure that they could not be used for military purposes.

67. He also recalled that although all States Parties to the Treaty agreed on the need to maintain the Treaty in force, they had not yet decided whether it should be extended for one or more fixed-term periods or for an indefinite period. His country was in favour of an indefinite extension of the Treaty, which it considered to be the only acceptable solution and the only means of achieving the objectives set in the area of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. Indeed, the other options could result in the lapse of the Treaty, sooner or later, and confront the international community with a legal vacuum in the matter of nuclear non-proliferation. That risk was particularly unacceptable as the renegotiation of the Treaty in current circumstances, or periodic reviews of the Treaty, accompanied at the end of each term by a vote on its continuation or cessation, the outcome of which would depend on the results achieved in nuclear disarmament, would be dangerous because it could create a climate of uncertainty and distrust and produce effects quite different from those anticipated, delaying nuclear disarmament and promoting the resumption of the arms race.

68. Referring to the efforts made to achieve complete nuclear disarmament, he said that the recent adoption by the Security Council of a resolution on the provision of "negative" and "positive" security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty was an important step forward. It would have been better, however, if the nuclear-weapon States waited for more substantial results in the field of nuclear disarmament, even if some real progress had already been made in that field. He also regretted the fact that those Powers had not reached agreement on the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and final cessation of nuclear tests, accompanied by a verification system.

69. Luxembourg was in favour of strengthening the IAEA safeguards, of prohibiting the production of fissile materials for the manufacture of explosives and of placing all non-military plutonium under the control of IAEA. Those initiatives which, thus far, had mainly been no more than projects and statements of intention, should be carried out and based on the non-proliferation Treaty which, in spite of its imperfections, was the only universal instrument in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, constituted one of the basic legal foundations of the IAEA controls and ensured the strategic and political stability that would permit accelerated nuclear disarmament.

70. Mr. DE SILVA (Sri Lanka) said that the non-proliferation Treaty had never been considered an end in itself but was more in the nature of a road-map for evolving a security order in which nuclear weapons were never meant to be a permanent feature. It was not the task of the Conference simply to choose between an indefinite or limited extension of the Treaty. The Treaty must be able to respond to the continually evolving challenges of peace and security. The length of the extension should not be viewed in terms of mutually exclusive options. While the political atmosphere surrounding the Conference was propitious, much remained to be done in the matter of nuclear disarmament, and it was particularly necessary to eliminate national arsenals, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and the diffusion of nuclear weapons.

71. The review of articles I and II of the Treaty would indicate that the general norm of nuclear non-proliferation had remained intact. The serious compliance problems which had emerged during the period under review showed that the Treaty needed strengthening as experience was gained through treaty practice. One important lacuna in the treaty verification regime derived from the fact that, under article III, the IAEA safeguards applied only to declared facilities. Yet several of the compliance concerns arose from activities related to undeclared facilities. The review conferences were the only forums accessible to all States Parties in which those questions could be addressed on an equal footing. Consideration might be given to the possibility of creating a verification mechanism based on the treaty regimes of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. A body of that nature would not require any amendment to the Treaty.

72. While a good consensus needed to be reached on the safeguards regime, it was also necessary to make an honest appraisal of the mounting problem of plutonium stocks and the related question of latent proliferation. Less than a third of plutonium stocks and an even smaller quantity of enriched uranium were under international safeguards. The security and environmental threats were considerable, and commercial or political interests should not be allowed to mask the gravity of that problem or the problem of the smuggling of nuclear material.

73. The strengthening of conventional safeguards must be supplemented by an international treaty regime governing fissile material. Such a treaty could enable the "threshold" States also to join an international non-proliferation regime on a non-discriminatory basis. Hence the importance of addressing the issue of stocks existing at a certain point in time. The offer of voluntary and limited application of safeguards by nuclear-weapon States would not be

sufficient to generate confidence among States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty which were situated in a geopolitical environment of unrestrained nuclear activity.

74. The application of articles III and IV of the Treaty, on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and material, deserved close attention. The complex problems of dual-use technology, the gaps in the safeguard regime and the suspicions against certain States Parties were questions that would continue to present formidable challenges to the Treaty regime. States Parties should look at contemporary methods and technologies of verifying compliance without hindering the satisfaction of the legitimate development needs of the safeguard-abiding States Parties. Article IV, paragraph 2, designed to promote solidarity and cooperation among States Parties remained an underutilized provision. The fuller utilization of that provision could elevate the Treaty regime to a broader framework for security and cooperation.

75. Article VI represented one of the core issues before the Conference. The nuclear-weapon States could not overlook the fact that article VI was a commitment yet to be fulfilled. It could not be interpreted as an encumbrance which would militate against the long-term viability of the Treaty. His delegation was confident that the Conference would take a positive and firm decision concerning the long-term extension of the Treaty. Commitments under article VI would provide the necessary political platform for a stronger decision. That decision should be underpinned by a consensus or by an overwhelming majority, otherwise there would be an avalanche of doubts.

76. Nuclear non-proliferation could not be isolated from nuclear disarmament. As was shown by the Chemical Weapons Convention concluded in 1992, a non-proliferation regime could only endure if it was conceived in an overall disarmament perspective. That was the essence of article VI, and the time had come to at least begin to rethink the existing security policies.

77. An unambiguous commitment to nuclear disarmament should be one of the principal results of the Conference. It was important to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty as early as possible. A comprehensive convention on fissile material could encourage the threshold States to gravitate towards global non-proliferation arrangements. Clear and unconditional security assurances in a legally binding form should be given to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. It was those States which, through their scrupulous compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, had established the near universal norm of nuclear non-proliferation. The least that the nuclear-weapon States could do was to give them legally binding assurances.

78. With respect to the regional aspects of non-proliferation, he was happy to note that the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone continued to gain ground in Africa. Unfortunately, that was not the case in the Middle East. In Sri Lanka's own region, South Asia, militarily significant countries had yet to conclude bilateral or multilateral treaties on nuclear non-proliferation. Disturbing concepts were currently being advanced in the region whereby current policies of nuclear ambiguity were giving rise to new heresies, such as the concept of "non-weaponized deterrence". Such new doctrinal developments could

neither advance regional security nor promote global stability and understanding. They were matters of particular concern to States Parties in the region which scrupulously complied with their Treaty obligations. His delegation therefore urged the nuclear-weapon States to be more forthcoming in advancing measures, such as the adoption of a treaty regulating fissile material and a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Such measures would encourage the threshold States to join in non-discriminatory non-proliferation arrangements within the framework of an internationally supervised verification regime.

79. His delegation would work assiduously to promote a consensus on the long-term extension of the Treaty in its entirety. It believed that such an approach would enhance the confidence of the current States Parties, allay the security concerns of at least some of the States which remained outside the Treaty, and promote universality.

80. Mr. SALLAL (Kuwait) said that the non-proliferation Treaty had had a positive impact on the maintenance of international peace and security and on efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. He therefore urged all States to accede to it. His country had been among the first to sign the Treaty as well as among the first to sign the partial test-ban Treaty and all the Protocols related to weapons of mass destruction, including bacteriological and chemical weapons.

81. The experience of Kuwait and the countries of the Gulf region in recent years did not support the view that accession to the Treaty was, in itself, a guarantee of international good conduct. Effective compliance with, and voluntary implementation, in good faith of, the spirit and letter of the Treaty were the only true criteria. The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, the liberation war which had followed and the various resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council, especially resolution 687 (1991) and the various stages of its implementation, had revealed the existence of a vast clandestine nuclear-weapons programme. Those activities were in flagrant violation of the safeguards agreement concluded with IAEA and an infringement of the commitments entered into by Iraq under the Treaty, especially those pertaining to articles II and III thereof. Furthermore, the critical information obtained by the international inspection teams had shown that there were significant gaps in the international effort aimed at the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, and that the Iraqi regime had shamelessly exploited those gaps. For those reasons and out of a concern about the need to strengthen and improve the system of assurances and its implementation by all States, Kuwait unreservedly endorsed the proposals calling for an increase in the efficiency of the system, to which all nuclear facilities, whether declared or undeclared, should be subject. It also supported the proposal that States parties should be required to subject all exchanges of fissile materials and related devices and equipment to the system of assurances, even if such exchanges took place with States which had not acceded to the Treaty.

82. Recalling that the non-proliferation Treaty had contributed to the realization of significant achievements and, in particular, to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in certain parts of the world, in accordance with article VII, he said that his country shared the deep concern of the other [illegible] States over Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty, an attitude whic[illegible]

obstacle to the establishment in the Middle East of a region free of weapons of mass destruction. In that connection, the League of Arab States had recently issued a statement in which it had stressed the universality of the Treaty and urged all States to accede to it; reaffirmed the support of the Arab States for the Treaty and its objectives and for the realization of its universality; and emphasized that securing peace and stability in the Middle East required the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction and that Israel's refusal to accede to the Treaty and to subject its nuclear facilities to the system of assurances constituted a threat to regional security and damaged the Treaty's credibility.

83. His delegation welcomed the bilateral Treaties concluded between the United States and the Russian Federation on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms (START I and START II), which should contribute to the reduction of nuclear arsenals. It hoped that the other nuclear-weapon States would take similar steps, in accordance with the provisions of those Treaties.

84. His delegation had followed closely the work of the Conference on Disarmament and welcomed the positive results achieved. In particular, it noted with satisfaction that progress had been made in the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which should lead to the conclusion of a full agreement before the end of 1995 or early in 1996. It also welcomed the establishment of an ad hoc committee to prepare a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons, since that would make it possible to tackle the issue of the stockpile of fissile materials and thereby facilitate the establishment of an efficient control system which would increase the transparency and effectiveness of the non-proliferation system. It also believed that Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was very constructive and hoped that multilateral negotiations would soon begin with the aim of reinforcing the assurances offered by the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States within the framework of a binding international treaty prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

85. Kuwait was all the more committed to the strict implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty, since the ordeal which it had endured during the Iraqi occupation had demonstrated the importance of international cooperation to the maintenance of peace and security, as well as the danger of the random stockpiling and export of weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction.

86. Mr. NOBILO (Croatia) said that the unstable and challenging times that had followed the end of the cold war required the reinforcement of the non-proliferation regime.

87. Croatia had become a party to the Treaty shortly after attaining independence, in June 1992. It had demonstrated its commitment to the objectives of non-proliferation by concluding a comprehensive safeguards agreement with IAEA in June 1994. It had also acceded to the International Convention on Nuclear Safety, which it regarded as an instrument for improving the safety of nuclear power plants. For that reason, it believed that the indefinite extension of the Treaty was the best way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to develop research into and the production and use of

nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, in conformity with article IV. It was also strongly committed to strengthening the safeguards system, especially with respect to the detection of undeclared activities.

88. While it was committed to the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty, however, Croatia was fully aware of its inherent inequalities and of the shortcomings in its implementation. It was therefore most important to ensure strict compliance with all the provisions of the Treaty if a more secure international environment was to be created at the threshold of the twenty-first century.

89. The Review and Extension Conference offered a unique opportunity for the nuclear-weapon States to reconfirm, in the strongest possible terms, their obligation under article VI to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

90. Although some progress had been made, particularly in the Conference on Disarmament, Croatia believed that further progress was essential. It hoped that the ad hoc committee responsible for negotiating a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be established soon and that the negotiations would begin. The same applied to the multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The conclusion of legally binding instruments on those topics would help to make the disarmament process irreversible. Croatia therefore urged the nuclear Powers to submit to IAEA safeguards any nuclear installations that were transferred from military to civilian use and all excess fissile material in their possession. Croatia commended the Zangger Committee for having strengthened export control, thus making it possible to combat more efficiently illicit trafficking in or smuggling of nuclear material. Non-proliferation was especially important to Croatia in view of the threat to peace and security posed by Serbia's aggression against its neighbours Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Possession of nuclear weapons by one of the sides in that tragic conflict would have disastrous consequences. He therefore once again urged the Belgrade Government to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, as the other successor States of the former Yugoslavia had already done.

91. The international community must deter aggression wherever it occurred, for otherwise the credibility of international instruments would be undermined and the temptation for certain countries to acquire nuclear weapons increased. The international community could not run that risk and must agree on an indefinite extension of the Treaty, complete nuclear transparency and the strengthening of cooperation in the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

92. Mr. BILOA TANG (Cameroon) said that, 25 years after its entry into force, the non-proliferation Treaty, to which 178 of the 185 States Members of the Organization had acceded, was still of the utmost importance. Everyone hoped to see the world freed of the nuclear threat, but that necessarily entailed respect for all provisions of the Treaty. The balance of terror that had reigned during the cold war had led to an accumulation of nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, for obvious reasons of geopolitical strategy, military cooperation had been

established between the nuclear Powers and some non-nuclear-weapon countries. That had led to horizontal proliferation and transfers of technology for military purposes, whereas cooperation for peaceful purposes, provided for in articles IV and V, had not yet produced the expected results, for some countries still had no access to technology.

93. Those shortcomings must be remedied if the Treaty was to become a truly global instrument, capable of promoting technological cooperation.

94. Since relations between States had always been based on force, including military force, permanent renunciation of nuclear weapons should be considered a sacrifice and a risk accepted by the 173 States Parties to the Treaty. That renunciation should therefore be accompanied by guarantees which should not be reduced to simple declarations of intent. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) would have been valuable if it had provided for implementation of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter to countries which used nuclear weapons against a country that had renounced such weapons in accordance with the Treaty.

95. Cameroon considered that the security safeguards should be strengthened through an internationally negotiated and binding legal instrument.

96. The progress made in the Conference on Disarmament was welcome. His country welcomed the establishment of committees to negotiate, respectively, an international test-ban treaty and a treaty banning production of fissile materials for military purposes. It would, of course, have been preferable for those two instruments, which must be binding and verifiable, to have been concluded before the current Conference.

97. It was regrettable that the detente resulting from the end of the cold war had not been accompanied by a reduction of the nuclear threat. The nuclear smuggling that was going on around the world was pernicious, for it could undermine the international efforts to eliminate proliferation. The international community should therefore take action and adopt forceful measures against those who failed to comply with international law. It should also strengthen the non-proliferation regime by encouraging the creation of nuclear-weapons-free zones in all regions of the world. In that connection, Cameroon welcomed the progress made towards the conclusion of a treaty on the denuclearization of Africa.

98. It was in the interest of the international community to pursue with determination its efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament by strengthening the non-proliferation regime. Cameroon therefore considered that the continued existence of the non-proliferation Treaty was essential in order to attain the goal of general and complete disarmament, due account being taken of the legitimate concerns of all parties.

99. Mr. KIM (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the South Korean authorities were not qualified to speak about the nuclear question in the Korean peninsula. It was those authorities which had allowed foreign forces to introduce nuclear weapons into the peninsula, exposing the entire nation to the risks of a nuclear holocaust. It was totally incongruous for them to express concern about a nuclear threat

from the North while saying nothing about the foreign nuclear weapons aimed at their compatriots in the North or about the nuclear programmes they were conducting in secret. If there was a nuclear threat it came from the south of the Korean peninsula and not the north. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States had demonstrated responsibility in implementing the "Agreed Framework". The problem was that the South Korean authorities were seeking to oppose that agreement by arguing that they should play a central role in its implementation, although they had no right to participate. In fact, they were motivated only by the sinister aim of seeking to make up for the failure of their past efforts to interfere in the talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States. It was essential to ensure that the efforts of the South Korean authorities to prevent the full implementation of the Agreed Framework did not succeed. If those authorities achieved their aims, the situation in the Korean peninsula would deteriorate seriously, against his country's will and to the great detriment of the peoples of the region.

100. Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that the accusations made by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were groundless. The Director-General of IAEA had told the Conference that IAEA had had grounds for indicating in its report to the Security Council that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was not respecting its safeguards agreement, that nuclear materials might have been diverted and that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had rejected a special inspection request from IAEA. In the interest of general respect for the guarantees and obligations deriving from the non-proliferation Treaty, it was to be hoped that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would submit a new statement of nuclear materials and authorize IAEA to inspect its installations as soon as possible. The statement by the Director-General of IAEA was bound to create doubts about the credibility of North Korea's allegations concerning a South Korean nuclear programme. The Republic of Korea had unilaterally renounced any possibility of developing nuclear weapons, as announced in December 1991 in a presidential declaration on a denuclearized Korean peninsula. Since the signing of a safeguards agreement with IAEA in November 1975, all nuclear installations in the Republic of Korea had been subjected to IAEA inspection. There was total transparency in that regard. If the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had doubts about those inspections, immediate verification could be undertaken by agreement between that country and the Republic of Korea. The Republic of Korea once again invited the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to open bilateral talks with it and to begin by applying the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula signed in 1992.

101. Mr. KIM (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said it had been the consistent policy of his Government to make the Korean peninsula a nuclear-weapons-free zone. The Joint Declaration represented great progress with regard to peace and security in the peninsula. It was, however, currently ineffective because the South Korean authorities were not supposed to involve themselves in questions relating to nuclear weapons. It was pointless at the current stage to refer to talks between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea or to the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Peninsula. It was necessary, first of all, to resolve the nuclear issue between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Only when that

issue had been settled in the way envisaged in the Agreed Framework could North and South Korea begin to implement the Declaration. His delegation therefore urged the South Korean authorities not to impede the implementation of the Agreed Framework. If there were nuclear weapons in South Korea, there had never been such weapons in the North, not even a single atomic bomb. The nuclear threat obviously came from the South. However, the South Korean authorities would never have a role to play in the resolution of the nuclear issue in the Korean peninsula because they had no say in the matter.

102. Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea) said he regretted the further unreasonable statement just made by the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and felt that no representative present would have faith in the efforts of the North Korean delegation to denigrate the Republic of Korea, in the light of what North Korea had said and done on the international scene. The international community clearly understood that those accusations against the Republic of Korea were erroneous and unfounded.

The meeting rose at 6.30 p.m.

1995 Review and Extension Conference

of the Parties to the Treaty on the

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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1995 REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 6th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 20 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

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GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

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95-80736 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.25 a.m.

EXPRESSION OF SYMPATHY IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMB ATTACK AT OKLAHOMA CITY, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

1. The PRESIDENT expressed sympathy to the Government of the United States of America in connection with the bomb attack on the previous day at Oklahoma City.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

2. Mr. ERDENECHULUUN (Mongolia) said that the decisions of the Conference would have a direct bearing on the international security environment well into the twenty-first century and would largely shape the multilateral disarmament agenda. The ultimate success of the Conference depended on a balanced and thorough assessment of what had been achieved under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, agreement on specific objectives to be attained with a view to promoting the implementation of the Treaty and strengthening the non-proliferation regime, and the extension of the Treaty by a consensus decision that would recognize the legitimate concerns of all States parties.

3. By and large, the Treaty had been successful, and had played an indispensable role in preventing the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons and promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The near universal adherence to the Treaty, including the adherence of all five declared nuclear-weapon States, was clear testimony to that role. Hence there was little doubt that the Treaty must go on serving the vital security interests of the international community.

4. The non-proliferation Treaty had never been an end in itself, but a means to an end. It was for that reason that conferences were held to review its operation. Everyone seemed to agree that the Treaty had been of great importance in preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. However, some important nuclear threshold States still chose to stay outside the Treaty; Mongolia endorsed the appeal that those countries which had not yet done so should accede to the Treaty as soon as possible. Universal adherence was essential to creating conditions favourable to general and complete disarmament - the ultimate goal of the Treaty.

5. Bold steps had been taken by the Russian Federation and the United States of America to reduce their nuclear arsenals. Some nuclear-weapon States had taken specific confidence-building measures, and the moratorium on nuclear testing had been in effect for some time for all but one nuclear-weapon State. Mongolia was encouraged by progress towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. A new global security environment had made the doctrine of nuclear deterrence obsolete and opened up new prospects for the further substantial reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. However, other nuclear-weapon States had yet to be brought into the strategic arms reduction process.

6. The non-nuclear-weapon States must be adequately assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the unilateral statements of nuclear-weapon States were welcome developments; however, an internationally negotiated legally binding document was needed containing unconditional and unlimited assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. That was particularly important for States which had also undertaken obligations with regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones. There was a precedent in that all five declared nuclear-weapon States had signed Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. It was to be hoped that similar arrangements could be worked out for other nuclear-weapon-free zones. In 1992, Mongolia had declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone. As a "nuclear-locked" country it welcomed the joint statement by China and the Russian Federation undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other and to detarget their nuclear weapons from each other, and also China's proposal to conclude a treaty on the non-first use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States.

7. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) played a pivotal role in the efficient functioning of the non-proliferation regime; its efforts must be supported in every way possible. The recent experience of non-compliance with safeguards-related obligations highlighted the need for improved and enhanced verification systems. Newly emerging risks associated with illegal trafficking in nuclear materials required urgent and effective measures at national, regional and international levels. The so-called "export control" regimes constituted another major ingredient of the non-proliferation regime; the application of those regimes should, however, be non-discriminatory and uniform.

8. With all its shortcomings, the Treaty was essential to strengthening international security and promoting peaceful nuclear cooperation. Mongolia believed that it would better serve the common interest to have the Treaty extended indefinitely. Whatever option the Conference chose, however, it was important to be guided by the rule of consensus in the interests of strengthening the Treaty.

9. Mr. MOUSSA (Egypt) said that Egypt, which had supported the non-proliferation regime and had become a signatory to the Treaty believed that it must become not only truly universal and credible but that it must maintain a balance through the commitment of all countries to honour their obligations thereunder. Unless that was achieved, the non-proliferation regime would merely benefit some countries at the expense of others and might exclude a third group of countries. Such a situation was unacceptable.

10. Egypt shared the view that, on the whole, progress in the implementation of the Treaty had not lived up to the expectations of its original architects. The much bigger stockpiles of nuclear weapons contradicted the objective of the Treaty. A comprehensive test-ban treaty and an agreement on prohibiting the production or stockpiling of fissionable materials for military purposes were yet to be concluded.

11. However, the most serious criticism levelled at the Treaty was the continuing disparity between the commitments of its parties. Such disparity was inconsistent with the new concept in international relations which called for

justice, equality and collective security in a climate devoid of nuclear weapons. Nuclear-weapon States should establish a framework in which they would reduce and ultimately eliminate their nuclear arsenals within a specific time-frame. On the other hand, the continuing absence of legal and effective security assurances to protect the States which had voluntarily renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons 25 years previously was a great disappointment since it defeated the very purpose of non-proliferation and could never lead to world security and universal peace.

12. Turning to the unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States contained in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), he said that, with the exception of the one issued by China, they were fraught with conditions and reservations. Unfortunately, the resolution still fell short of providing the required security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States from the threat of nuclear weapons as it focused on assistance in the case of nuclear aggression to the detriment of other crucial elements such as deterrence, protection and effectiveness.

13. Noting that there was a serious imbalance in international cooperation with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and the transfer of such technology to non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty and the discriminatory treatment and double standards applied by export control groups, he called for a thorough review of the work of such groups which, he suggested, could be transformed into an international regime which included all parties to the Treaty and would subject all the nuclear activities of specific States to the IAEA full-scope safeguards regime as a prior condition for the supply of nuclear technology or nuclear materials to the States in question. That international norm should apply to all States including non-States parties.

14. Egypt believed that the universality of the Treaty was a sine qua non for the achievement of its purposes. Its extension would merely reaffirm the legal norm upon which the non-proliferation regime had been established. Even States that were not parties should abide by that norm; otherwise, efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime would be undermined by according a special status to those States which had chosen to remain outside. In his delegation's opinion, such a situation would be both unfair and illogical.

15. For decades, Egypt had maintained consistent and clear-cut positions at both the regional and international levels with respect to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In that connection, it had worked tirelessly to spare Africa and the Middle East from the nuclear peril, including the efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and the Middle East and the multilateral track on Arms Control and Regional Security.

16. Turning to the situation in the Middle East he noted that the issue of nuclear armament continued to be a source of concern and a threat to the security of the whole region. His country considered as extremely dangerous the existence on its eastern borders of a nuclear programme outside the scope of the IAEA full-scope safeguards. It had conducted extensive consultations with all its regional partners as well as with influential national parties with a view to reaching specific international or regional arrangements that would protect the region from the dangers of nuclear weapons and affirm the determination of

all parties, including Israel, to adhere to the international covenants and the non-proliferation Treaty, in particular, and to place Israel's nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards. Egypt had proposed that an official process of negotiations should be initiated on the provisions related to the establishment of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction; all States in the region should undertake to accede to international legal instruments relating to all weapons of mass destruction; such accession should coincide with the conclusion of peace agreements between Israel and the parties involved in the Middle East peace process; and discussions should be held on the possibility of conducting mutual verification of nuclear facilities.

17. Those proposals had been aimed at enhancing security for all in the Middle East and further reinforcing the credibility and stability of the Treaty. In that context, Israel's continued failure to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty was not conducive to progress; indeed, it would be irresponsible to urge States of the region to agree to an indefinite extension of the Treaty even as one State within the region was benefiting from an exemption that allowed it to maintain a nuclear programme outside the boundaries of international legitimacy. Stability in the region could not prevail in the face of security imbalances or military supremacy that would benefit no one; nor would it serve regional peace or international peace and security. Despite all Egypt's efforts, Israel had rejected all the proposals, even though it had always joined in the consensus on the General Assembly's resolutions calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and for all the States of that region to join the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Egypt was therefore calling upon Israel to reconsider its position and to enter into the same commitments as its neighbours in the region. His delegation also urged all States parties to consistently endeavour to ensure the strict adherence of all States in the region to policies consistent with the principles and provisions of the Treaty.

18. He recalled that Egypt had signed and ratified the Treaty on the assumption that it would encourage Israel to take similar steps. Israel had failed to do so despite assurances from several countries to that effect. The entrenchment of the de facto status quo by the indefinite application of the Treaty to all the Middle East countries, with the exception of Israel, constituted a serious imbalance threatening not only the region's security but its stability as well. The League of Arab States had recently declared that such a situation was unacceptable. The Middle East was going through a period of extreme sensitivity and significance where the foundations of future peaceful relations in the region were being laid. That could not be accomplished if there were double standards or privileged status was granted to one party at the expense of the other.

19. Although Egypt supported the Treaty despite its imperfections, it could not endorse the indefinite extension thereof, because the regional situation remained volatile and unsatisfactory. That notwithstanding, Egypt would participate actively in the work of the Conference. The extension decision should be linked to specific steps aimed at achieving the objectives of non-proliferation and the universality of the Treaty; enhancing its effectiveness towards striking a balance between the responsibilities of all its parties; concluding two conventions on a comprehensive nuclear test ban and on the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of fissionable materials for

military purposes respectively; providing legally binding security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States and ensuring the right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy to all States parties.

20. Mr. LAMAMRA (Algeria) said that Algeria was participating for the first time in a conference of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, to which it had formally acceded on 13 January 1995. It had already voluntarily subjected its two radioisotope reactors to IAEA safeguards. Since 1991, Algeria had also acceded to other multilateral disarmament instruments and was preparing to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction.

21. Despite the intrinsic imbalances of the Treaty, it was a cornerstone of collective security and must remain so. With the end of the bipolar division of the world, there should be unprecedented momentum for its implementation. The agreements concluded between the United States of America and the Russian Federation were encouraging; however, further reductions must be carried out, and the other nuclear-weapon States must undertake comparable actions with a view to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. The delays in the implementation of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly were well known, as were the limitations placed on multilateral negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament and the impediments to the access of developing countries to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including the alarming reduction of resources made available to IAEA. Even the security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States had been adversely affected by the selective and restrictive approaches embodied in Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995).

22. Efforts must be intensified to achieve decisive progress in the full implementation of the commitments embodied in the Treaty. A comprehensive test-ban treaty must be concluded as soon as possible and immediately take effect. Negotiations must be undertaken for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, which, to be truly verifiable and universally applicable, must ensure that existing stockpiles were placed under effective international control. A satisfactory formula must be found to guarantee non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons, beyond Security Council resolution 984 (1995) which had only revived resolution 255 (1968) with all its imperfections. Security assurances must have sufficient deterrent force to be credible. Pending the elimination of all nuclear weapons, which constituted the only real guarantee of security, non-nuclear-weapon States were entitled, on an unconditional basis, to credible and effective security assurances which were not subject to interpretation or veto. They should be codified in a binding legal instrument drawn up within the Conference on Disarmament as the only forum for multilateral disarmament negotiations. The legitimate right of developing States to have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, in line with the IAEA safeguards system, also needed to be established.

23. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones needed to be promoted through concrete action. Nuclear-weapon States must encourage such zones, particularly in Africa and the Middle East, and must accede to additional protocols to guarantee respect for the status of such zones and provide security

assurances to Member States. Algeria, which had always supported the Declaration by the Organization of African Unity on the denuclearization of Africa, was actively participating in drawing up a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the African continent and neighbouring islands. It was confident that once that Treaty was concluded, the nuclear Powers would make the commitments to Africa they had accepted under Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

24. The aspirations of Arab countries to the establishment of a zone free from nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East had already been forcefully reaffirmed. In the new political atmosphere, the Middle East region could no longer be subjected to damaging selectivity with regard to the universality of the Treaty and the objective of non-proliferation. The legitimacy of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was also formally acknowledged in Security Council resolution 667 (1991), adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter with binding force for all Member States.

25. The Conference had a historic responsibility to strengthen the political and moral authority of the Treaty and ensure progression towards universality. The conclusions of the Conference should prepare the way for the development of a new nuclear disarmament instrument similar to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which was an example of what could be achieved with the necessary political will. Efforts must be made to reach consensus on the extension of the Treaty. The forthcoming ministerial meeting of the coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement would be able to make a valuable contribution to those efforts.

26. Mr. YASSIN (Sudan) said that the review, analysis and assessment of the non-proliferation Treaty must be objective, taking into account both its achievements and its deficiencies. Undeniably, it had made a contribution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and such agreements as START I and II, which fell within its framework, had led to a reduction in medium and short-range missiles. It had made possible the voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons by Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa and Ukraine. Yet, despite those accomplishments, the Treaty had not fully met the aspirations of its parties.

27. As a product of the cold war era, the non-proliferation Treaty had deepened the gap between nuclear "haves" and "have nots". As a discriminatory treaty, it had approved the possession of nuclear capability by certain States, while closing the door to others. It also lacked a mechanism for enforcing the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States, whose arsenals had continued to grow despite the binding effect of article VI. Those States had also failed to honour their obligations under article I not to transfer nuclear materials or assist any non-nuclear-weapon State in manufacturing such weapons, thus defeating one of the Treaty's main objectives of universality. The persistent refusal of Israel to heed the call to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, to renounce its nuclear weapons and to place its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards had jeopardized efforts towards the establishment of nuclear-free zones in the Middle East, Africa and Asia. The Sudan strongly supported the acceleration of efforts to finalize a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a step towards complete nuclear disarmament within a specific time-frame.

28. With respect to IAEA safeguards under article III, double standards and selectivity had been applied. A legally binding mechanism for universal verification, for non-nuclear-weapon and nuclear-weapon States alike, was needed. Moreover, the Director-General of IAEA had discussed the Agency's fragile financial situation, which seemed incompatible with the huge expenditures of nuclear-weapon States on their military nuclear programmes. It would appear that those States were not serious about strengthening the Agency and providing it with the resources required to carry out its mandate.

29. Effective verification would only be feasible if an agreement could be reached between nuclear and non-nuclear States banning the production, stockpiling, export and import of fissionable materials for non-peaceful uses. The Conference on Disarmament must intensify its efforts towards the conclusion of such an agreement. Efforts to prevent some States from acquiring nuclear technology for peaceful uses was a clear contravention of articles IV and V, however.

30. With regard to negative and positive security assurances, Security Council resolution 984 (1995) had not broken any new ground. The Sudan called upon the nuclear-weapon States to give clear, direct and binding security assurances through an agreement complementary to the non-proliferation Treaty binding on all which would meet the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States that they would not fall victim to nuclear aggression by acceding to the non-proliferation Treaty.

31. His delegation did not see any interest in the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty when no effort would be made to attain universality and satisfactory security assurances.

32. Mr. BOUEZ (Lebanon) said that his country did not see the Treaty as an end in itself, but as a means to achieve the objective of ridding the world ultimately and comprehensively of the dangers of nuclear weapons. The universality of the Treaty was fundamental if it was to remain credible, useful and effective. Another primary objective was the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Review of the Treaty must also include a provision for the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. In that regard, Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was not satisfactory.

33. Because of Israel's failure to sign the Treaty, the Middle East was imperiled by their nuclear armament at a time of complex relations and violent conflict. The Governments and the peoples of the Middle East would not accept the consecration of Israeli domination in the region by allowing it to maintain its nuclear arsenal. The realization of peace in the Middle East required a reduction in the level of armament, in order to avoid an escalating regional arms race. Thus, Israel's adherence to the Treaty was an urgent necessity, if it was serious about creating favourable conditions for peace.

34. Commitment to the letter and spirit of the Treaty alone could guarantee some balance between nuclear-weapon States and those who had undertaken not to acquire nuclear arms. Lebanon did not believe that indefinite and unconditional extension was the best way to guarantee the non-proliferation regime. It was vital to maintain the practice of adopting resolutions by consensus on an issue

of such great importance for the future of international relations. Periodic review would provide the necessary flexibility to respond to new and changing circumstances. Every review would shed light on the "absentees" and prompt renewed efforts to make the Treaty truly universal.

35. The Security Council, as the body entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security, must enforce Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter without double standards if was to be relied on as a just political arbiter.

36. Mr. TURNQUEST (Bahamas) said that a common feature of previous Treaty review conferences had been the dissatisfaction expressed by the non-nuclear States parties regarding the failure of the nuclear States parties to implement the nuclear disarmament pledges contained in article VI. However, since some progress had been made towards halting the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, it could be concluded that the Treaty had performed satisfactorily on the whole.

37. Some important issues and concerns remained to be resolved before the Treaty could gain the universal support and confidence of the international community. An atmosphere of mistrust persisted with regard to the true nature of the nuclear programmes of both non-nuclear and nuclear-weapon States; moreover, regional and global efforts were required to obtain the accession of the several States remaining outside the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States had further to commit to a complete cessation of fissionable material production for weapons purposes, and to clarify their positions on nuclear weapons testing. Although they welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances by the nuclear-weapon States, the non-nuclear-weapon States also required a more legally binding commitment from them with regard to such assurances.

38. While not viewing the successful conclusion of a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty to be essential for the success of the present Conference, the Bahamas called for all efforts to be undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a verifiable test-ban Treaty that would be universally supported and subject to periodic review.

39. Deliberations at the present Conference must therefore be inclusive of all States parties regardless of their nuclear status, and must establish whether nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States had fulfilled their obligations under articles II, III and VI. Whatever the outcome, the decision on the Treaty's future ought to be definitive.

40. Despite the shortcomings of the Treaty, the Bahamas was of the view that an indefinite extension of the Treaty would continue to provide greater assurances for preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons, both horizontally and vertically.

41. Mr. IBAÑEZ (Peru) said that the Treaty was the sole effective guarantee of the international non-proliferation regime, and that the significant growth in its membership unequivocally reflected its success. Peru firmly supported the indefinite extension of the Treaty as the sole available means of continuing the

process of nuclear disarmament and of making peaceful nuclear cooperation possible. Review conferences should continue to be held at five-year intervals, and some consideration should also be given to establishing monitoring mechanisms. However, in view of the fact that a divergence of views existed among the States parties with regard to central aspects of the Treaty, the decision on extending it should respond to the will of the broad majority of those States.

42. Peru believed that it was imperative to prohibit all nuclear tests as well as the production and storage of fissionable material; to establish adequate and legally binding security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States; to strengthen the existing multilateral mechanisms for safeguards, detection and verification; and to ensure, improve and increase nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes.

43. With the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Latin America had made a commitment to nuclear non-proliferation throughout the region. At the XIVth General Conference of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), Peru had suggested harmonizing and linking the southern hemisphere nuclear-weapon-free zones already established through the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga and the Antarctic, and those to be established in Africa and in the South Atlantic.

44. Mr. ABDUL MOMIN (Brunei Darussalam) said that the Treaty was an expression of the international community's desire to rid itself of nuclear weapons, and called for the signing and implementation of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). His delegation shared the concern of many others about the increased number of countries possessing weapons of mass destruction, as well as the continuing modernization of those weapons. It was their belief that the Treaty should be demonstrably strengthened, and that a strong review mechanism and safeguard system should be put in place. Parties to the Treaty should explicitly define their commitments as stated in article VI, and activities between signatories and non-signatories in contravention of the Treaty should be ended.

45. Brunei Darussalam was concerned at the Treaty's continuing lack of regular and effective review mechanisms, but was prepared to support indefinite extension of the Treaty if, following a thorough process of review, the majority of Conference members favoured such a decision.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 7th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 20 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

President:	Mr. DHANAPALA	(Sri Lanka)
later:	Mr. FOSTERVOLL (Vice-President)	(Norway)
later:	Mr. DHANAPALA	(Sri Lanka)

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95-80748 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

EXPRESSION OF SYMPATHY IN CONNECTION WITH THE BOMB ATTACK AT OKLAHOMA CITY

1. The PRESIDENT expressed to the people and Government of the United States the sympathy of the delegations of States participating in the Conference, in connection with the terrorist attack on the previous day at Oklahoma City.

2. Mrs. ALBRIGHT (United States of America) thanked the delegations of States participating in the Conference for their expressions of sympathy and their offers of assistance.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

3. Mr. GRAHAM (New Zealand) said that the non-proliferation Treaty had achieved its main objective since it had helped to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. He commended the wisdom of such States as Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and South Africa which had abandoned an existing nuclear capability and acceded to the Treaty, which currently had 178 States Parties.

4. That success, however, should not obscure the fact that, until very recently, progress in disarmament had been much more disappointing and the arms race had been allowed to accelerate for some 20 years. There was no doubt that if the decision on the future of the Treaty had had to be taken in 1990, it would have been difficult to decide in favour of an indefinite extension.

5. However, during the past five years, the armaments race had stopped, agreements on the reduction of nuclear arsenals by two thirds had been concluded and negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty had progressed. The Conference was therefore opening in a propitious climate and the Parties should take the opportunity to ensure that there was no turning back from the present course of disarmament.

6. Clearly, the declared nuclear-weapon States had a particular responsibility. New Zealand expected them to accelerate the negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which it hoped could be completed before the end of 1995, which marked the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations.

7. However, New Zealand noted with concern that one nuclear-weapon State was continuing to conduct tests and another was contemplating the resumption of testing. While welcoming the active participation of China and France in negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, he hoped that they would do nothing to jeopardize the early conclusion of those negotiations.

8. Progress had also been made in the area of the production of fissile materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons with the establishment by the Disarmament Conference of an ad hoc committee to deal with that question. The negotiations would certainly be lengthy and difficult, but an agreement would be an important step towards a situation in which the total elimination of nuclear

weapons could be negotiated. The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty should commit themselves to the negotiations, as they contributed to the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States under article VI of the Treaty.

9. With regard to the Treaty of Rarotonga, under which a nuclear-weapon-free zone had been established in the South Pacific in 1986, his delegation appealed to the signatories strongly to endorse the objectives of that Treaty, and it urged all nuclear-weapon States to accept the obligations set out in the Protocols to the Treaty. Russia and China had already signed Protocols II and III, and it was to be hoped that the United States, the United Kingdom and France would soon be in a position to accept them too, as well as the Protocol relating to the stationing of nuclear weapons in territories of the South Pacific for which they were responsible.

10. Turning to the question of security assurances, he welcomed the announcements made recently by the five nuclear-weapon States and the decisions taken by the Security Council. The time had come to negotiate an instrument setting out the assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States pending the elimination of those weapons. New Zealand urged the rapid re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on negative security assurances, which would provide a forum for negotiations.

11. Much of the progress made in nuclear disarmament in the past few years had been the result of bilateral negotiations. New Zealand had warmly welcomed the START I and START II agreements, but it would also hope that all five nuclear-weapon States would indicate how they intended to continue the process of nuclear disarmament. It would not be enough to adopt a convention banning the military production of fissile materials. Efforts should also be made to negotiate a verifiable agreement banning the production of nuclear weapons and putting an end to vertical proliferation. The United States and Russia had stated that their bilateral arms race had ended, and therefore the situation seemed favourable for further progress.

12. Concluding his remarks on article VI, he expressed the hope that the final document adopted by the Conference would reflect the importance of the issues he had mentioned. That document should provide for the strengthening of other fields of activity covered by the Treaty, such as trade and cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the safeguards system. It should thus endorse the work undertaken by IAEA since 1990 to strengthen its safeguards system, particularly under Programme 93 + 2; reiterate the principle, adopted by the Parties in 1990, that the non-nuclear-weapon States should not receive nuclear supplies unless they agreed to make all their nuclear operations subject to IAEA safeguards, and provide guidance in respect of the management of fissile materials resulting from the dismantling of nuclear weapons.

13. On that point, New Zealand welcomed the United States decision to put excess fissile material under IAEA safeguards and the efforts made by the States of the former Soviet Union to deal with nuclear materials in their territory. On the other hand his country was very concerned at reports of trafficking in nuclear materials. Effective national systems of control and accountancy were needed and, at the international level, there should be cooperation enabling

that problem to be solved. Greater transparency was also needed in all matters relating to the management of plutonium and highly enriched uranium.

14. He felt that the Treaty would be considerably strengthened in the fields he had mentioned if the Conference reached agreement on each of those issues and on the progress to be made under article VI. In conclusion, he recalled that when the General Assembly had adopted the Treaty in 1968, his country had made it clear that the Treaty should not be regarded as an isolated measure. That position remained unchanged and, while hoping that the Treaty would soon become universal, New Zealand looked forward to the day when a world without nuclear weapons became a reality.

15. Mr. PETERSEN (Denmark) endorsed the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France on behalf of the European Union and the six Eastern European States associated with the Union, and said that he was in favour of an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty.

16. Denmark believed that the amount of disarmament undertaken should not obscure the fact that the risks of proliferation had increased and that international control was needed more than ever before. Although imperfect, the Treaty had none the less scored many successes, since 178 States had become signatories, the number of nuclear-weapon States had not grown and the fact that the Treaty was now close to universality was increasing the pressure on States that not yet become Parties to it.

17. Referring to the delicate balance between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States established by the Treaty, he said that, at the Conference which they had held in 1990 in the shadow of the cold war, the parties had been unable to reach a consensus. Since then, considerable progress had taken place in disarmament and the 1995 Conference was meeting under much more favourable auspices.

18. The commitment made by the United States with regard to the banning of nuclear-weapon tests, which Denmark itself had long urged, was particularly laudable. His delegation hoped that the ongoing negotiations would soon be concluded. It also awaited with impatience the fulfilment of the promises that further reductions would be made in the nuclear arsenals following the START Treaties, and the elaboration of a treaty to cut off the production of fissile materials. It would follow closely the work of the Conference on Disarmament on those questions, in particular regarding verification measures in connection with the comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and the elaboration of a convention to cut off the production of fissile materials.

19. On the question of the international safeguards system, he said that the obligation of States parties, under article III of the Treaty, to conclude safeguards agreements with IAEA could allow of no exception. He therefore urged all non-nuclear-weapon States which had not yet done so to place all their nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. Various States parties to safeguards agreements had failed to meet their commitments in recent years, thereby posing challenges to the safeguards system. Such challenges were unacceptable and the Conference must react by endorsing new measures to strengthen the safeguards system.

20. Similarly, the maintenance of effective export control measures was essential and the guidelines established by the Nuclear Suppliers Group constituted an important element in the international non-proliferation regime. Denmark encouraged all States to apply them. Illicit transfers of nuclear material had recently emerged as a threat to the effectiveness of the safeguards system. Such transfers placed demands on the producing States to impose stricter export controls. In that connection, Denmark welcomed the United States decision to place its excess fissile material under safeguards. Other producers should be encouraged to do the same.

21. It was important to be ambitious. Denmark's ambition was to help to create a consensus in favour of the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty. If a vote were to be taken, it should be an open vote, in accordance with the democratic principles of political accountability. The decision on extension must in no way be held hostage to the review process. A good and thorough review, however, would undoubtedly work in favour of indefinite extension.

22. Mr. RAVELOMANANTSOA-RATSIMIHAH (Madagascar) said that, since it had regained its independence, Madagascar had paid the greatest attention to all matters relating to world peace and international security. It had, for instance, been among the first 62 States to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which it had ratified on 10 August 1970.

23. The Treaty, which should be universal and to which more than 170 States had already acceded, was an important achievement for the whole international community and it must be carefully preserved. It was, in effect, the only international instrument which entailed disarmament commitments on the part of the nuclear Powers. It also provided a framework for exchanges in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

24. On the basis of that achievement, many countries, in particular developing countries, would be able to receive increased assistance from IAEA in various fields which were important to the enhancement of the well-being of their people, including medicine, agriculture and the environment.

25. As a result of the considerable progress achieved in the field of arms control and disarmament since the end of the cold war, the Conference was being held under favourable auspices. Madagascar hoped that those developments would lead to the early adoption of a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.

26. With regard to security assurances, the initiatives taken in that connection - in particular the adoption on 11 April of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) - showed that the nuclear Powers were prepared to take into account the legitimate concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

27. The progress which had been achieved should not, however, obscure the fact that the threats of proliferation had not disappeared: the alarming existence of stockpiles of fissile materials opened the way for an evolution which was all the more dangerous in that the world was witnessing a resurgence of regional ambitions and terrorism; the control and verification system of IAEA had shown

its limitations; the non-nuclear-weapon States remained without sufficient security assurances; and the transfer of civilian nuclear technology had not kept pace with the expectations of the developing world. In the face of those challenges, the provisions of the Treaty must be strengthened. That would be in the common interest of all States, both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon.

28. The continuity of the Treaty, the adoption of practical measures to ensure the implementation of its provisions, the attainment of its objectives and the balance of contracted obligations were elements which would give it renewed vigour and make nuclear disarmament more dynamic. The commitment of the parties, in particular with regard to article VI, would strengthen the conviction that the Treaty would serve the interests of collective security. In order to give greater force to the Treaty, it was essential to adopt a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in the near future, and to elaborate a legally binding instrument which would provide security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and would be binding also on States which were not parties to the Treaty. It was also important to establish a schedule for the elaboration of an agreement prohibiting the production or stockpiling of fissile materials for the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

29. With regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, cooperation must be strengthened through the regulation of transfers of technology within the framework of the IAEA safeguards system, the effectiveness of which Madagascar hoped would be enhanced. An appropriate financial contribution should support the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to the developing countries which were parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

30. The non-proliferation Treaty had admittedly not yet attained the desired level of perfection but, since the nuclear Powers had made a commitment to pursue negotiations in good faith with a view to nuclear disarmament and had adopted Security Council resolution 984 (1995), States should take advantage of the exceptionally favourable international context to give the Treaty the permanent status which would promote progress towards its universality.

31. Mr. MAYOR (Switzerland) welcomed the fact that the non-proliferation Treaty was almost universal and that, since the Fourth Review Conference in 1990, some 30 additional States, including two nuclear Powers, two countries which had had military nuclear programmes and three countries which were successors to a nuclear Power, had acceded to it.

32. In assessing the situation with regard to the Treaty, several aspects should be considered. As far as horizontal non-proliferation was concerned, the success achieved was relative. The alarmist predictions that there would be some 20 nuclear States by the end of the century had not come true, but India, Pakistan and Israel had since acquired a military nuclear capacity. In Africa and Latin America, there had been favourable developments, since those two continents should soon become nuclear-weapon-free zones. In the Middle East, the situation was less encouraging, but it was to be hoped that, within the framework of the peace process which had been going on for some time, the Egyptian and Israeli proposals regarding the establishment of a denuclearized zone in the region could be implemented.

33. With regard to vertical non-proliferation and disarmament, the results obtained were clearly less conclusive. The two nuclear super-Powers had admittedly agreed to make substantial reductions in their arsenals, but the number of warheads was almost the same as 25 years earlier and their effectiveness was much greater.

34. The Conference would provide an appropriate opportunity for States to reaffirm their commitment to eliminate weapons of mass destruction within a specific time-frame. In the absence of further progress in that field, the delicate compromise reached between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States during the negotiation of the Treaty would be imperilled. It was in the interests of all countries that the START II Treaty should be speedily ratified and put into force. It was also necessary that nuclear weapons should be dismantled in a safe manner and that the resulting fissile material should be placed under international control. It was important to ensure that such material could never again be used for weapons production.

35. The cut-off in the production of fissile material for explosive devices would be a valuable supplement to the dismantling of existing weapons. In that regard, Switzerland welcomed the establishment by the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee with the mandate to negotiate a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. It hoped, however, that that mandate had not been adopted merely to pacify States with an eye to the current Conference, but testified to the desire to obtain speedy results.

36. The negative security assurances were another field in which the non-nuclear-weapon States remained dissatisfied. The nuclear Powers should undertake, unconditionally and unambiguously, and in the context of a multilateral treaty, never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against States which had renounced them. The absence of such assurances provided arguments to those who viewed the non-proliferation Treaty as inequitable.

37. It was encouraging that negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty had begun in 1994 in the context of the Conference on Disarmament. However, Switzerland was disheartened by the lack of progress achieved to date and considered that the idea of providing for exceptions to the general prohibition was incompatible with the spirit of article VI. Whatever the motives and arrangements for such exceptions, it would leave lingering doubts over the will to ensure that nuclear tests would never again take place.

38. The example of Iraq having demonstrated the need to strengthen the system of safeguards, Switzerland welcomed the fact that IAEA had taken specific measures promptly and that it was no longer satisfied with simple, regular inspection of declared installations.

39. Switzerland had never doubted the need to establish a sound and reliable non-proliferation regime. That was why it had immediately ruled out the option of extending the Treaty for a single additional period. The choice between the other two options (indefinite extension and several renewable additional periods) had been a difficult one, since each of the two formulas presented

undeniable advantages and would in principle be acceptable. The option of unconditional extension for an indefinite period seemed, in current circumstances, to be the most suitable means of gathering the support needed for a strong non-proliferation regime. It was essential that the decision to extend the Treaty should be taken speedily and with a sizeable majority, since a weak majority would not augur well for the future of the Treaty.

40. Switzerland's vote would, however, be accompanied by the earnest hope that the nuclear Powers would fully honour their pledges and would give tangible signs without delay of their will to eliminate nuclear weapons. Switzerland hoped that, before the review conference in the year 2000, treaties on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests and on a cut-off in the production of fissile material for explosive devices would be in force. Furthermore, the five nuclear Powers would need to have reached agreement on a timetable for progressive and substantial reductions in their arsenals.

41. Mr. WIN MRA (Myanmar) said that the Treaty had undoubtedly curbed nuclear proliferation. Without it, the number of nuclear-weapon States would have been much greater. Those achievements had been somewhat undermined, however, by the size of nuclear arsenals. Yet nuclear non-proliferation was not an end in itself; it was but one step towards complete cessation of the nuclear-arms race and, ultimately, general and complete disarmament. The obligations of the nuclear-weapon States in that regard were clearly stipulated. It was encouraging that the two major nuclear Powers had started to dismantle their installations and destroy their nuclear warheads, but the current Conference should provide an opportunity for them to commit themselves anew to the elimination of nuclear weapons within a reasonable time-frame.

42. With regard to horizontal non-proliferation, the Treaty was a resounding success: the non-nuclear-weapon States parties had faithfully fulfilled their obligations by renouncing their sovereign right to possess nuclear weapons. That sacrifice should not, however, deprive them of their inalienable right to develop the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, provided that their nuclear activities were subjected to the IAEA safeguards system.

43. Although there were now over 170 States parties to the Treaty, it was not yet truly universal. In his delegation's view, scrupulous observance by the nuclear-weapon States of their Treaty obligations would strengthen the credibility of the Treaty and would encourage those States which had not yet done so to accede to it.

44. The security of non-nuclear-weapon States was no less important than that of a nuclear-weapon State. Until nuclear weapons were eliminated, the former were entitled to effective security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. To be effective, those security assurances must be in the form of a legally binding international instrument. The basis for such an instrument could be the draft protocol to the Treaty on security assurances submitted by some 12 States, including Myanmar, at the Conference on Disarmament. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) did not obviate the need to conclude an international and legally binding instrument.

45. Nuclear-weapon States and some other States had recommended an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. Many non-nuclear-weapon States, including Myanmar, did not share that view. They felt that the third option of rolling fixed periods of credible length with a strong review mechanism was the most appropriate option. It would be constructive to work out a modified version of that option by building into it an appropriate decision-making mechanism to move from one fixed period to another. His delegation would pursue that matter further during the Conference in order to work out, together with like-minded countries, an appropriate modality for that option.

46. However, a decision on the extension of the Treaty should be preceded by an extensive review of the Treaty and progress in crucial areas such as nuclear disarmament, a nuclear-test ban, security assurances, a ban on the production of fissile material and access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

47. Myanmar, which had acceded to the Treaty in 1992, had just signed the IAEA safeguards agreement. It attached great importance to the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, and considered that the decision to be taken by the Conference concerning the extension of the Treaty must be acceptable to all States parties.

48. Mr. Fostervoll (Norway), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

49. Mr. JOKONYA (Zimbabwe) said that non-nuclear-weapon States, in acceding to the non-proliferation Treaty, had done so in the sincere belief that the nuclear-weapon States would scrupulously honour their obligations. Yet over the 25 years of the Treaty's existence nuclear arsenals had continued to grow, without the non-nuclear-weapon States having had either any mechanism or leverage with which to bring pressure to bear on the nuclear-weapon States.

50. The current Conference was the only chance the non-nuclear-weapon States had to evaluate the progress made, to strengthen the provisions of the Treaty and to prevent the legitimization and institutionalization of the dichotomy between nuclear "haves" and "have-nots".

51. Some States parties had conducted a relentless campaign for an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. It was premature to take such a decision, which might lead to a perpetuation of current imbalances and would erode the voice of non-nuclear-weapon States in nuclear disarmament matters.

52. In common with many others, his delegation supported an extension of the Treaty, but only after it had been transformed into an action-oriented instrument. To that end the review process should identify specific objectives for future years, in particular an immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race, the conclusion and implementation of a nuclear-test-ban treaty, a legally binding commitment on security assurances, and the conclusion of a non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

53. Promises were not guarantees, and it was hard to see how the non-nuclear-weapon States could be reassured by mere statements of intent, since the nuclear-weapon States had very reluctantly adopted a watered-down Security Council resolution on security assurances. Nuclear-weapon States had an obligation, within the framework of a binding legal instrument, to provide unconditional security assurances on the non-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which had renounced such weapons. They should also respect the international accords that had given birth to nuclear-weapon-free zones and should fully support denuclearization initiatives.

54. With regard to the extension of the Treaty, Zimbabwe questioned the intentions of nuclear-weapon States and other developed countries that made constant reference to indefinite and unconditional extension, whereas the Treaty referred only to indefinite extension.

55. The fact that 178 States were parties to the Treaty was by no means an indication that the Treaty in its present form should be made permanent. It demonstrated, rather, that the international community was firmly convinced of the need for nuclear disarmament and in due course total and general disarmament.

56. Restricted measures outside IAEA safeguards should not be used as tools to impede the peaceful use in some countries of nuclear technology for civilian purposes. It was vital for all States parties to the Treaty that had signed the IAEA safeguards agreement to have unobstructed access to nuclear technology.

57. Zimbabwe, like others, was fully persuaded that there should be no hurry to immortalize an inadequate treaty. Rather, the opportunity presented by the Conference should be used to strengthen the provisions of the Treaty and make good its deficiencies. He trusted that the conclusion of their deliberations would ensure that each and every State, large or small, nuclear or non-nuclear, had a decisive say in the deliberations on the prospects for nuclear disarmament.

58. Mrs. RODRIGUES (Mozambique) said that the end of the cold war offered an opportunity to reaffirm the support of the international community for a treaty which for more than 25 years had been an important instrument in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. For its part, Mozambique, since its accession to independence, had fought for a world free of nuclear weapons where peace would reign. From the outset Mozambique had incorporated in its Constitution the principle that Africa should be a nuclear-weapon-free zone and the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. The Treaty had become quasi-universal, which meant that most countries in the world were committed to the ideal of non-proliferation, and that non-nuclear-weapon States were voluntarily refraining from acquiring nuclear weapons.

59. For that reason Mozambique supported an indefinite extension of a treaty which had proved its value and effectiveness. The discussion on the duration of the Treaty did not, however, address the heart of the matter. The main concern was, rather, the inequalities and imbalances reflected in the Treaty. For it to become a credible and effective instrument for peace and disarmament it would be necessary, in the view of Mozambique and most other non-nuclear-weapon States,

for a number of conditions to be met, namely, the attainment of complete and general nuclear disarmament, the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the adoption of positive and negative security assurances in a legally binding instrument, and respect for the international legal instruments creating nuclear-weapon-free zones.

60. The nuclear non-proliferation regime was not an end in itself. Article VI of the Treaty, which called for negotiations in good faith leading to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and the conclusion of a comprehensive disarmament treaty, had remained largely unimplemented. Similarly, a comprehensive test ban remained elusive despite the fact that its importance was universally recognized and even if the ongoing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament were encouraging.

61. As far as security assurances were concerned, Mozambique welcomed adoption by the Security Council of its resolution 984 (1995), which, together with Security Council resolution 255 (1968), constituted a welcome initiative on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. Nevertheless the resolution fell short of providing the assurances demanded by the non-nuclear-weapon States, in particular those in the non-aligned movement.

62. Regarding the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, she expressed the support of her country for an institution which had proved to be the best instrument to promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Her delegation urged the nuclear-weapon States to take specific steps in that domain, in compliance with articles IV and V of the Treaty. In that regard she congratulated the Republic of South Africa, a neighbouring country, for having given up its nuclear-weapon capability and thereby enhanced not only the stability of southern Africa but also confidence throughout the continent.

63. The foundations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty lay in the symmetric obligations imposed on both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States parties. That was why Mozambique supported extension of the Treaty and maintenance of the mechanisms provided for in article VIII, paragraph 3.

64. Mr. ELIASSON (Sweden) said that the main responsibility of the States participating in the Conference was to reaffirm that all nuclear weapons must be eliminated from the face of the earth, in the spirit of the preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The limitless destructive character of nuclear weapons made nuclear disarmament a moral imperative.

65. The Treaty contained the only contractual commitment by nuclear-weapon States to negotiate in good faith on nuclear disarmament. It embodied the pledges by almost all other nations to forgo nuclear weapons. Sweden had renounced the nuclear-weapon option in 1969, having concluded that its own security would be strengthened, and not weakened, if it refrained from acquiring nuclear weapons. That commitment to the goals of the Treaty was supported by the nation as a whole, which welcomed the quasi-universality of the Treaty, which was thus raised to the level of general international law.

66. There had been encouraging developments since the 1960s, when the Treaty had been negotiated. First, the feared emergence of at least 20 nuclear-weapon

States had not occurred. Secondly, since 1990, more than 30 States had acceded to the Treaty, and with the accession of China and France in 1992, all the declared nuclear-weapon States were parties. Thirdly, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which had Soviet nuclear weapons in their territories, had acceded to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. Lastly, threshold States had given up the nuclear option. South Africa had set an historic example.

67. The non-proliferation regime had three main objectives. The first was to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT had an excellent record in that respect. Even States which were suspected of having nuclear ambitions were not encouraging speculation that they possessed clandestine nuclear weapons. Instead, they were claiming that they would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons, or that their nuclear programmes were peaceful. Those States should follow the example of South Africa. In connection with the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, Sweden welcomed recent positive developments regarding the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the question of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa.

68. The second objective of the Treaty was international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The third was, of course, nuclear disarmament. In other words, the NPT was a key to both nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. The three objectives were mutually reinforcing and should be actively pursued together.

69. Turning to the question of nuclear disarmament, he said that progress had been distressingly absent for a long time in that area. However, START I had been concluded and START II should soon enter into force. That would provide a basis for further disarmament involving all nuclear-weapon States. There had also been recent security assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States, and a resolution had been adopted on that subject by the Security Council. Those unilateral declarations could form a basis for a multilateral treaty on negative security assurances, and could be further developed into declarations of no first use of nuclear weapons.

70. Sweden also saw encouraging signs in the negotiations at the ongoing Geneva Conference on Disarmament regarding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. It was of vital importance for all the States involved in the negotiations to reach agreement before the end of 1995. Sweden appreciated the nuclear-test moratorium being observed by all but one of the nuclear-weapon States. It expected the moratorium to continue until it could be replaced by a treaty banning nuclear tests for ever. The Conference on Disarmament had decided to start negotiations on a treaty on the cut-off of production of fissile weapons materials. Existing stockpiles should also be the subject of those negotiations. Despite all those positive developments, it was still necessary for the delicate balance between commitments to nuclear non-proliferation and to disarmament within the NPT to become a reality.

71. The report entitled "Our Global Neighbourhood" (A/50/79), presented by the Commission on Global Governance, stated: "The international community should reaffirm its commitment to progressively eliminate nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction from all nations, and should initiate a ten to fifteen year programme to achieve this goal." There was no reason to accept the existence of

nuclear bombs, when the international community had agreed to ban the others weapons of mass destruction - the chemical and biological weapons. It was reasonable to demand a specific time schedule for nuclear disarmament, along the lines of the START Treaties.

72. With respect to the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Sweden urged all States to ensure that the Agency was provided with the resources needed to fulfil its verification task in accordance with the NPT. It endorsed the new measures proposed to strengthen IAEA safeguards. It called for urgent progress towards the separation of military and non-military nuclear activities and facilities in all non-nuclear-weapon States.

73. On the question of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, Sweden recognized the Treaty's contribution to the elimination of the technological gaps between the developed and the developing countries. Preferential treatment should be given to non-nuclear States that were parties to full-scope safeguards agreements with IAEA. Nuclear suppliers had agreed on criteria for technology transfers based on the principle that recipient States should have safeguards agreements with IAEA. Such arrangements did not prevent such States from acquiring and developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. It was of fundamental importance to strengthen nuclear safety and radiological protection. Since the 1990 Review Conference, initiatives had been taken to improve the safety of power reactors in Eastern and Central Europe and in the former Soviet Union. Since that should be a priority task, Sweden urged all States to ratify the IAEA Nuclear Safety Convention. It was gratified by progress made in the preparation of a convention on the management of radioactive waste.

74. The final part of his statement would be devoted to the question of the extension of the Treaty. To reach a fair and just decision on that question, the international community should compare commitments with actual achievements. In accordance with article VI of the Treaty, all nuclear-weapon States had undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament. In 1995, all declared nuclear-weapon States were parties to the Treaty, and substantial progress had been made in the field of disarmament. The States concerned should establish a specific time schedule for the implementation of disarmament measures. The NPT provided for review conferences every five years. They would serve as future checkpoints to ensure that the commitments of States parties were honoured.

75. There was a question as to what would happen if the Conference failed to extend the Treaty indefinitely. According to the Commission on Global Governance, all nations, whether they possessed nuclear weapons or not, stood to gain from indefinite extension. Failure to extend the NPT indefinitely could seriously compromise the credibility of the non-proliferation regime itself. It could also lead to rapid and uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons. Lastly, it could cause nuclear Powers to undertake unilateral action to prevent proliferation.

76. The international community must not let the Treaty run the risk of expiring. It was of fundamental importance that the commitments to disarmament should be embodied in an international Treaty to which most States had acceded,

and that substantial further results should be registered. Uncertainty about the future of the Treaty would not facilitate nuclear disarmament, but might well endanger results that were within reach. Elimination of nuclear weapons was not a technical matter for experts, but a matter of values. After thorough consideration, Sweden had come to the conclusion that the NPT should be extended indefinitely.

77. Ms. MENON (Singapore) said that even though the cold war had ended, the spectre of nuclear proliferation continued to hang over the international community. It was therefore timely that States should come together to review the Treaty aimed at preventing proliferation, and to decide on its future.

78. Singapore supported an indefinite extension of the NPT. It was the only international treaty aimed at containing nuclear proliferation, a goal that was one of the cornerstones of global security. The Treaty was too important to be put under the risk of termination. It provided the best available framework for cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Despite its shortcomings in some areas, it had been successful in containing the spread of nuclear weapons.

79. Singapore agreed that the Treaty should be strengthened. It was not convinced, however, that giving it a limited life-span was the best way to do so. On the contrary, the uncertainty surrounding a limited extension could jeopardize the progress that had already been made in the field of disarmament. It was essential to build up a comprehensive and effective disarmament regime that would ensure a secure and stable environment. At the same time, there was an urgent need for greater efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to meet the objectives of the NPT and to demonstrate unequivocally their resolve.

80. Those States were obligated, under article VI, "to pursue negotiations in good faith" with a view to disarmament. They must make a clear commitment to pursue that goal and redouble their efforts to work towards the early conclusion of disarmament treaties and conventions that would complement the NPT regime, such as a comprehensive test-ban treaty and an agreement on the cessation of production of military fissile materials, and to make declarations providing security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. In that connection, his delegation was encouraged by the adoption, on 11 April 1995, of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) concerning security assurances. It had also noted with satisfaction the individual declarations on security assurances made earlier that month by the five nuclear Powers.

81. With regard to article III, his delegation supported all measures to enhance the effectiveness of the IAEA safeguards system. The Conference should look at ways to strengthen the verification of compliance with the Treaty and to promote confidence-building. His delegation would also like to see the establishment of a strong periodic review mechanism to ensure that all parties met their obligations under the Treaty.

82. Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) resumed the Chair.

83. Mr. VONDRA (Czech Republic) said that, for a quarter of a century, the non-proliferation Treaty had played an irreplaceable role as a barrier against further proliferation of nuclear weapons. When the Treaty had been negotiated

in 1968, nuclear weapons had already been added to the arsenals of certain countries and, throughout the cold war era, vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons had continued unabated, posing a serious threat to international security. Nevertheless, the Treaty had proved its effectiveness and viability and had helped to check proliferation. The number of States parties was growing and, in the preceding five years, 39 States, including two nuclear-weapon States and a number of technologically advanced countries, had acceded to the Treaty.

84. His delegation strongly believed that the international community should continue to support the Treaty and that the best way to do that was to make it permanent. There was a need for a permanent guarantee against nuclear proliferation, even if the risk of a global nuclear holocaust had been reduced. Some countries, especially those in areas of tension, might be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons.

85. Major changes had occurred in the world in recent years. The two super-Powers, which had previously confined themselves to mere arms control measures, had begun to make significant reductions in their nuclear arsenals. France and the United Kingdom had scaled down their nuclear-weapon programmes. Four of the five nuclear Powers had been observing a moratorium on nuclear testing for some time.

86. The experience had been that nuclear cooperation had not been unduly hampered by the Treaty; if anything, such cooperation had developed too liberally, affording some States the opportunity to develop their own nuclear-weapon programmes. He underlined the importance of the control activities of IAEA, especially its safeguards, which played a crucial role in the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty. The discovery of clandestine nuclear-weapon programmes in certain countries highlighted the importance of improving and strengthening safeguards.

87. His country, which had a long tradition of peaceful use of nuclear materials, which offered technical assistance and training to a number of countries in the field of nuclear physics and chemistry and which generated 30 per cent of its electricity at nuclear power plants, was convinced that reliable safeguards did not interfere with the peaceful use of nuclear energy but, on the contrary, created conditions for its wider and safer use. His delegation would like the verification activities of IAEA to be more stringent and nuclear exporters to take additional measures in that regard. His country was prepared to cooperate with IAEA in developing and implementing effective measures to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear materials.

88. His delegation firmly supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. Even so, it recognized the desirability of additional nuclear-arms control measures, namely, the early achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. His delegation welcomed the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament. Although it participated in the Conference only as an observer, it contributed to the work of its group of governmental experts and had offered to make available a highly sensitive seismic station for verifying compliance with the future comprehensive test ban.

89. On the subject of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, his country had voted in favour of resolution 984 (1995), adopted unanimously by the Security Council on that matter. He also noted with satisfaction that important measures had been taken in the field of nuclear disarmament, especially in recent years. The START I Treaty, when fully implemented, would lead to a significant reduction of American and Russian nuclear arsenals; it was to be hoped that the START II Treaty would be ratified soon and that further measures of nuclear disarmament would be agreed upon. Another encouraging development was the fact that for the first time in history serious negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty had been initiated in Geneva with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States. Far from hindering efforts to work out such a treaty, the extension of the non-proliferation Treaty would create a climate more conducive to the conclusion of a test-ban treaty and the adoption of further nuclear disarmament measures.

90. As to progress at the regional level, he welcomed the decision taken by the Government of South Africa to forgo its military nuclear potential and to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty. It was also encouraging that Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had decided to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. He noted with satisfaction Cuba's decision to accede to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, thereby helping to strengthen the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the solemn commitments given by Argentina and Brazil to renounce any intention of acquiring nuclear weapons.

91. His delegation associated itself fully with the statement made by France on behalf of the European Union and, in particular, the conclusion that what was expected of the States parties was the consolidation of the non-proliferation regime and the confirmation of the disarmament process. His country therefore favoured extending the non-proliferation Treaty indefinitely and unconditionally.

92. Mr. GERVAIS (Côte d'Ivoire) said that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should serve to consolidate the important progress made over the preceding 25 years and to reinforce the achievements made in the area of nuclear disarmament. The primary task was to confirm the new spirit of peace that had emerged in a world which for decades had lived under the threat of thermonuclear war. It was also a matter of adopting a hopeful measure reflecting the aspirations of the entire international community for a new culture of peace.

93. The current international political situation offered a unique opportunity to put an end to the nuclear-arms race. Africa, for its part, on which a heavy toll had already been taken by history, was participating fully in efforts under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations to promote the signing of a treaty to make the African continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone. His country had made peace one of its guiding principles and supported that objective without reservation. It intended to sign the treaty in question which should reinforce the non-proliferation Treaty through a solemn step inspired by article VI.

94. His country believed that the only way to dispel the threat of a nuclear holocaust was for States to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty, as 178 had

already done, and to strengthen the provisions of the Treaty which dealt with cooperation, in particular those in article V concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In addition, it saw a need to extend the Treaty indefinitely and considered that the declarations on security assurances recently made in the Security Council by certain nuclear-weapon States were useful commitments which should be reinforced in the context of a Treaty whose permanence was ensured.

The meeting rose at 5.45 p.m.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.1995/SR.8
25 April 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

1995 REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 8th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 21 April 1995, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. DHANAPALA (Sri Lanka)

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GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS

REQUEST FOR OBSERVER STATUS

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95-80760 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. HURST (Antigua and Barbuda) said that at the time when the Treaty on The Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons had been readied for signature, Antigua and Barbuda had still been a colony. All but six of the States which had achieved independence since 1970 had understood the dangers of nuclear weapons and nuclear war and had become signatories to the Treaty.

2. The primary benefit of the Treaty was its containment of the spread of nuclear weapons to additional States, thereby reducing the risk of nuclear war and nuclear accidents. However, the Treaty had failed to limit the number of nuclear weapons, so that the nuclear-weapon States now had more nuclear weapons than in 1970. Despite the nuclear disarmament measures taken by the nuclear-weapon States, and the security assurances in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), a great deal more remained to be done.

3. The terms of the Treaty and related agreements needed to be made sufficiently attractive to achieve universal acceptance. That would be difficult to achieve, however, since the interests of many States were diametrically opposed. Several States wanted their perceived advantages to be made permanent, while others wished to end their evident disadvantage and elicit greater security assurances from the powerful. Yet, if the remaining 13 sovereign States did not accede to the Treaty, the future which awaited mankind would be even more uncertain and dangerous than in the past.

4. His delegation was greatly concerned about the vulnerability of small island States to nuclear-weapons testing. Threatened by global warming and rising sealevels, such States could not successfully deal with nuclear fallout from nuclear testing; the islands would have to be abandoned, effectively ending those countries' very existence. Every unilateral moratorium on weapons testing must become legally binding and permanent. The Treaty of Tlatelolco protected the small island States of the Caribbean; the Treaty of Rarotonga could do the same for the small island States of the South Pacific if the nuclear-weapon States signed that Treaty and its protocols. It defied reason for large and powerful democratic States to refrain from giving legally binding assurances to small island States which could not possibly threaten them or do them harm.

5. Antigua and Barbuda supported an indefinite extension of the Treaty on the understanding that the nuclear-weapon States would continue to accelerate their efforts towards complete nuclear disarmament.

6. Mr. GOLOB (Slovenia) said that the Treaty had been the first multilateral treaty to which the Republic of Slovenia had succeeded; it had done so in the hope that the Treaty would be a step towards the total and final prohibition of testing and of nuclear weapons. The Treaty had served the world well and had survived the end of the cold war; Slovenia hoped that it would be indefinitely extended. In the post-cold-war era, there were strong grounds for extending the Treaty. There was a marked trend towards individualization of the national

policies of many countries, even those that were members of integrations or defence organizations; that trend was not altogether negative, but it would be unacceptable if it went beyond the limits defined by the Treaty.

7. A number of occurrences in recent years had shown that there was only a thin line separating the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and attempts at developing nuclear weapons. International crime syndicates and others that might exploit lax safeguards posed another threat. The role of the Treaty therefore remained vital. Slovenia believed that it provided a sound basis for attaining the goal of eliminating the nuclear threat by creating a nuclear-free world. Lack of progress towards disarmament was not a reflection of the quality of the Treaty but a result of lack of will by States parties.

8. The threshold States, mostly developing countries that were spending enormous amounts on nuclearization on the grounds that it would enhance their security, should follow the positive examples of Argentina and Brazil, and of South Africa. In all those cases denuclearization had been helped by mutual trust.

9. It was, first and foremost, the permanence of the Treaty which could help improve the atmosphere. In addition, it was crucial for nuclear-weapon States to take specific measures for complete nuclear disarmament and to enhance their security assurances. The recent assurances made by the nuclear-weapon States, and Security Council resolution 984 (1995), were an initial step. Security assurances would play a very significant role for quite a time until complete nuclear disarmament was attained; they would need to be included in a multilaterally binding instrument.

10. Slovenia hoped that a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be concluded by 1996, and that efforts to achieve a ban on the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons would be further intensified. The export control regime of nuclear substances must be enhanced in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That step should not impede nuclear technology tests for peaceful purposes.

11. The progress achieved in Africa, Latin America and the South Pacific in establishing nuclear-free zones was encouraging. Slovenia welcomed the expanding circle of Contracting Parties to the Treaty, particularly those States which had given up nuclear weapons and joined the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

12. Slovenia believed that indefinite extension of the Treaty would promote confidence-building and mutual trust and enhance the disarmament process. However, confidence created in that way would soon fade away if not underpinned by true progress in nuclear disarmament. It was vital that the Conference should determine that all the essential issues had been thoroughly reviewed and that further progress in the disarmament process was viable.

13. Mr. VELAYATI (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that in a new global milieu and in a much more representative international community, the Conference was a significant opportunity to strengthen the Treaty and the non-proliferation regime in all aspects, thereby enhancing international peace and security. With

the end of the cold war era and bloc rivalries, the need to build a solid foundation for global security was all the greater. The Treaty had paved the way for the achievement of the ultimate objective of nuclear disarmament, but that objective had yet to be accomplished because of the imbalances between the obligations and responsibilities of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States parties. That situation, together with the non-fulfilment of obligations by nuclear-weapon States parties, were the weaknesses of the Treaty. Those elements merited a thorough and objective review by the Conference with a view to securing a genuine, truly universal and non-discriminatory nuclear non-proliferation regime.

14. A review of the implementation of article I underscored an ever-widening gap between promises and reality. Certain nuclear-weapon States had provided direct and indirect assistance for the development of nuclear-weapon capabilities. It was no secret that some countries which had remained outside the Treaty had gained access to nuclear weapons. Certain nuclear-weapon States which were ostensibly the most active advocates of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons had not only generously provided materials and know-how to Israel to enable it to develop nuclear weapons but also turned a blind eye to Israel's production and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction, tacitly exempting it from the Treaty, despite its record of reckless expansionism. Furthermore, the apartheid and Israeli regimes had acquired nuclear-weapon capabilities at a time when they had been under international scrutiny, condemnation and sanctions; that would not have been possible without the assistance or, at least, the acquiescence of the nuclear-weapon States and other nuclear-advanced countries.

15. That approach had destabilized the Middle East region and generated spiralling crises. Moreover, the threat posed by Israel's possession of nuclear weapons and its refusal to accept the non-proliferation Treaty and IAEA safeguards had led a number of States in the region to decide not to accede to international instruments prohibiting weapons of mass destruction, most notably the Chemical Weapons Convention. That trend had been devastating for the security of those States as well as to the credibility of the Treaty itself. It also constituted a major impediment towards the universality of the Treaty and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, which Iran had first proposed in 1974, and ran counter to the objectives of article VII.

16. The failure of nuclear supplier countries to provide complying States parties with material for peaceful purposes was yet another area of non-implementation of commitments. The Treaty unequivocally recognized the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as the legitimate and inalienable right of States parties. For States parties which had faithfully fulfilled their obligations, any discriminatory approach or imposition of restrictive control regimes was totally unjustifiable. Efforts to regulate the transfer of nuclear technology must be transparent and must take place only within the framework of the Treaty.

17. Non-realization of the objectives of article VI was another shortcoming. The nuclear-weapon States had failed to take substantive measures towards complete nuclear disarmament and, instead, had developed and upgraded their

nuclear arsenals in an unbridled fashion. That approach had helped intensify the apprehension of the international community.

18. The Islamic Republic of Iran believed that the Treaty's future should be meticulously intertwined with the periodic examination of progress achieved towards the implementation of a number of measures. First and foremost, a programme of action should be adopted for the significant reduction and total elimination of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles within a specific time-frame; the Conference on Disarmament must be fully utilized to begin serious negotiations in that regard. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty must be concluded at an early date and a comprehensive, verifiable and legally binding treaty on the prohibition, production and stockpiling of nuclear-weapons-grade fissionable materials should be concluded. Technology and materials for peaceful nuclear activities should be transferred without any discrimination; as it was essential for nuclear supplier countries to undertake not to prevent access of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, cooperation among the parties must be facilitated and expanded. His delegation also believed that secretive groupings with restricted membership that undermined the Treaty should be phased out; on the other hand, agreement must be sought to establish a body representing all the parties, including developing countries; it must conduct its work in a transparent manner. Nuclear-weapon States must provide negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States through an international legally binding instrument; in that regard, the recent positive security assurances provided by the Security Council constituted a step in the right direction. Nuclear-weapon States must abide by and adhere to the instruments establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones and must support initiatives taken by the States parties in the regions concerned, with a view to establishing such zones, particularly in the Middle East. As an essential, mutually reinforcing element, all nuclear facilities and installations must be placed under IAEA safeguard systems. Universality of the Treaty must be achieved. In that connection, the reported possession by Israel of nuclear weapons and that country's stubborn refusal to accept international control had a serious destabilizing effect on the Middle East. The resolution of that problem by the international community was an essential requisite to reducing the nuclear threat in the region and paving the way for the achievement of a truly universal Treaty.

19. He believed that the Treaty should be extended indefinitely only after all the obligations set forth thereunder had been fully complied with. In the meantime, the only viable option was a form of extension that was consistent with article X.2, was compatible with the Treaty's objectives and ensured an early realization of the Treaty's purposes and provisions. Indeed, the crucial issue was to arrive at a consensus extension agreement in an atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation free from any political and economic pressures that were aimed at imposing a specific extension option on States parties. Anything less would lack the moral authority and collective will of States parties.

20. Since IAEA had been established to ensure the full implementation of the Treaty in good faith, it must be strengthened. More credence should be given to its reports and findings, while at the same time effective measures should be adopted to ensure that outlaw regimes like Israel, which stubbornly rejected the Treaty, or States which violated it, were not immune from international

accountability and reprisal. Failure to achieve universality of the Treaty and to ensure the full implementation of its provisions could jeopardize the aspirations of future generations to live in a world free from weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.

21. His delegation would fully support the extension of the Treaty, which it viewed as a legal instrument of paramount importance for the maintenance of international peace and security.

22. Mr. MARTINEZ BLANCO (Honduras) said that the Conference provided the opportunity to enter into serious commitments that might help to avert the threat of nuclear war and to give some thought to the grave danger involved in the proliferation of nuclear weapons and fissionable materials. Fully aware of the danger represented by nuclear weapons and their proliferation, the Latin American and the Caribbean countries, including Honduras, had entered into the Treaty of Tlatelolco as their contribution to the noble cause of denuclearization and economic development because it permitted the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Moreover, it established the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a large inhabited region of the planet. The countries of the region therefore hoped that the Treaty of Tlatelolco would stand as an example for the whole world. Also noteworthy in that regard was the Treaty of Rarotonga which established another denuclearized zone in the South Pacific. His delegation hoped that treaties for a nuclear-free zone in Africa and the Middle East would be concluded in the not too distant future.

23. The Government of Honduras viewed as positive the statements that had been made by the nuclear-weapon States members of the Security Council on new security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Those statements contributed to strengthening the non-proliferation regime and to allaying the fears raised by ambiguous nuclear policies. For those reasons, his delegation had voted in favour of Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

24. Expressing concern about the recent cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials, he expressed the view that a system of export controls over such materials and technologies was necessary as a security guarantee.

25. Honduras had welcomed the ratification of START I and believed that a prompt ratification of START II would be a positive contribution by the United States of America and the Russian Federation towards nuclear disarmament. Since Honduras believed that the elimination of the production, use and threat of use of weapons of mass destruction would contribute to global security, it supported an indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty. It would therefore devote its efforts towards the achievement of that goal and hoped that in the near future the Treaty would become a universal instrument.

26. Mr. CLARE (Jamaica) said that, while the Treaty represented the most important regulatory instrument in the nuclear-arms-control regime, progress in nuclear disarmament over the past 25 years had been slow and there were doubts about how effectively the parties had attempted to reach the objectives of the Treaty. He called on the Conference to undertake a careful assessment of the Treaty's goals to determine to what extent the parties had fulfilled their obligations and facilitated progress towards nuclear and general disarmament.

27. Compliance in all the areas covered by the Treaty had been inadequate and disappointing. Despite encouraging steps recently taken by some of the nuclear-weapon States to halt the nuclear-arms race, the Treaty's goal of restricting the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons remained unrealized. Likewise, while there had been some success in stemming horizontal proliferation, the Treaty's provisions for nuclear technology transfer had not been faithfully honoured. Non-parties were known to have acquired nuclear capability; in addition to effective safeguards, there was a real need for entrenchment of the international consensus against proliferation. In such a context, the cessation of the nuclear-arms race would remain elusive without an explicit and firm commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to conclude the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty.

28. The Jamaican Government believed that, before being extended, the Treaty and expectations for its future performance had to be thoroughly assessed in view of existing international realities. The entire international community needed to declare and reaffirm its commitment to achieving the Treaty's objectives by pursuing such complementary arrangements as the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and a convention against the production of fissionable material.

29. Moreover, the non-nuclear-weapon States needed security assurances from the nuclear-weapon States. Security Council resolution 984 (1995), reaffirming the responsibilities of nuclear-weapon States to respond to the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States, was a step in the right direction. Jamaica also supported the call for greater commitment on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to facilitate access by Treaty parties to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes under article IV. It urged the Conference to issue a declaration expressing the commitment of the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States to pursue that objective as well as the other stated objectives of the Treaty.

30. Mr. TESHABAEV (Republic of Uzbekistan) said that the indefinite extension of the Treaty was one of the most reliable means of achieving a secure world. Uzbekistan's decision to support the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty was a logical extension of its nuclear disarmament policy. It called for stricter implementation of all articles of the Treaty, and stressed the necessity of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones, and reiterated its resolute opposition to all weapons of mass destruction. As a member of IAEA, Uzbekistan had assumed responsibilities for implementing and strengthening safeguards and controls on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and pledged to continue to fulfil those responsibilities in the future.

31. Mr. BULL (Liberia) said that, as a developing country without the technology or inclination to develop nuclear capability, Liberia had realized that becoming party to the Treaty offered the best safeguards as well as possibilities of future access to atomic energy for peaceful uses. It was particularly heartening that 178 States had joined the Treaty, affirming the widespread commitment to the goal of general and complete disarmament. He called on the few remaining States to accede to the Treaty in order to achieve its universality before the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations.

32. Among the achievements of the Treaty had been the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in several regions of the world. Liberia commended the

Republic of South Africa for its accession to the Treaty and for its unilateral decision to dismantle its existing nuclear-weapons programme, which had enabled African countries to finalize a treaty declaring the entire African continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Important strides had been made in the nuclear disarmament field, but if the Treaty was to be further strengthened, a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty must be concluded.

33. Liberia welcomed Security Council resolution 984 (1995), by which the nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed the security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. That important undertaking might be strengthened, however, by the conclusion of a mandatory legal instrument. It was important that IAEA should be strengthened and verification arrangements and safeguards unconditionally enforced.

34. There was nearly universal agreement that the Treaty was vital to the continued survival of mankind, and therefore, should remain in force. Its unencumbered extension would strengthen the Treaty rather than weaken it. The provision for periodic review should allow effective monitoring to ensure full implementation. Liberia, therefore, favoured indefinite extension. Its experience of the devastation caused by its civil war had made it acutely aware of the effects which the availability of weapons could have in prolonging unnecessary suffering.

35. Mr. SNOUSSI (Morocco) said that, in the new strategic environment created by the end of the cold war, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction had become one of the primary concerns of the international community. Its dangers were even more apparent in the light of new and unfamiliar threats to international security. The many bilateral and multilateral agreements concluded in the area of nuclear disarmament over the past 25 years represented important steps towards the complete denuclearization of the planet.

36. The non-nuclear-weapon States, however, still felt a measure of insecurity in a world where some Powers continued to possess nuclear weapons. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty remained one of the primary objectives of those States in enhancing their security. Morocco supported the unilateral moratoriums observed by most of the nuclear Powers, along with the negotiations towards an agreement prohibiting the production of fissionable materials.

37. The Treaty remained an effective and vital security regime, which had provided the first line of defence against nuclear proliferation during its 25 years of existence. Morocco believed that the Treaty was essential as the cornerstone of the broader non-proliferation regime between nuclear and non-nuclear States. That regime could be strengthened by the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world. The requirements of transfer of technology for development purposes should not be neglected, however.

38. Although recent developments in the Middle East peace process were encouraging, more progress could be achieved if all the States of the region were to take concrete measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Ridding that region of nuclear weapons would benefit not only international peace and security, but the economic and social development of the region. Morocco urged all the States of the region which were not yet party to the

Treaty, particularly those with nuclear capability, to accede to it and to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA full-scope safeguards.

39. The future of the Treaty, whether its extension would be indefinite or of a limited duration, was the concern of all the parties, for neither legal rulings or majority vote could replace an agreement taking into consideration their legitimate interests. Morocco would cooperate closely with all delegations in a productive analysis of the Treaty that would meet the concerns of all the parties.

ELECTION OF VICE-PRESIDENTS

40. The PRESIDENT said that the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States had nominated Trinidad and Tobago to fill the remaining post of Vice-President.

41. Trinidad and Tobago was elected Vice-President by acclamation.

REQUEST FOR OBSERVER STATUS

42. The PRESIDENT said that the Credentials Committee had recommended that the request of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for observer status to the Conference should be approved.

43. It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.

1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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28 April 1995
ENGLISH
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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 9th MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Friday, 21 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

President:	Mr. DHANAPALA (President)	(Sri Lanka)
later:	Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Vice-President)	(Venezuela)
later:	Mr. DHANAPALA (President)	(Sri Lanka)

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GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

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95-80772 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. GYLYS (Lithuania) said that his country had become a party to the Treaty shortly after regaining independence, and it encouraged States that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty to avoid weakening the non-proliferation regime and jeopardizing the security interests of all.

2. Being concerned about its regional security, Lithuania had noted with great satisfaction the accession of Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus to the non-proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. It felt, however, that the end of the cold war had created a security vacuum in central and eastern Europe which could not be ignored, because it affected disarmament questions.

3. Because it believed that any uncertainty about the future of the Treaty or regarding security assurances would harm the security interests of all, Lithuania supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the non-proliferation Treaty and universal accession to the Treaty, which could thus become a pillar of global security in the twenty-first century. In that connection he supported the statement made by the French delegation on behalf of the European Union.

4. However, the Treaty had its weaknesses and, in particular, the legitimate security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States needed to be addressed. New security assurances were necessary to ensure a balanced non-proliferation regime. Lithuania welcomed the offer, made for the first time by the five nuclear-weapon States in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), to extend both negative and positive security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

5. It endorsed measures to foster regional security, as provided in article VII of the Treaty. It attributed great importance to the efforts being made to establish an area free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East and appreciated South Africa's decision to dismantle its military nuclear weapons programme, thus, giving reason to hope that Africa might soon become a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

6. Lithuania was also encouraged by the progress made in the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and an agreement on cessation of the production of fissile materials for purposes of weapons production since, in any case, the non-proliferation Treaty needed to be supplemented by other legally binding instruments.

7. With regard to the IAEA safeguards system, it should be strengthened by random inspections to prevent the diversion of fissile material and of sensitive technology. Lithuania had accepted IAEA safeguards for its nuclear activities and supported the ongoing efforts to strengthen the system. Recent cases of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and radioactive substances gave cause for concern, and the safe storage of fissile material and the protection of the environment must be ensured during the disarmament process. More effective physical protection, accounting and border controls were needed to counter that

problem. International assistance and cooperation should therefore be encouraged where the system of protection and control was inadequate. Being dependent on nuclear energy and having one of the biggest power plants in the world, Lithuania appreciated the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and welcomed assistance in the area of nuclear safety, among others.

8. In conclusion, he said that the process of nuclear disarmament gave reason to hope that the goal of a world free from nuclear weapons could be achieved. However, while the nuclear-weapon States had taken steps in the right direction, bigger steps were needed in the future.

9. Mr. AL-ASHTAL (Yemen) said that the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was of paramount importance and offered a historic opportunity to take stock of the 25 years of existence of the Treaty in order to see how far States Parties had discharged their obligations and responsibilities under the Treaty, to study the difficulties encountered and to agree on a common approach to ensure the continuation and universality of the Treaty after 1995. Although the Treaty pursued a wide range of goals, it still had certain deficiencies, the major deficiency being the inequity existing between the responsibilities and obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States and those of the nuclear-weapon States, to which the Treaty accorded privileges. In fact, as the four previous review conferences had clearly shown, the most difficult problem in the implementation of the Treaty was the failure of nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligations and commitments under article VI of the Treaty, in which each Party undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Moreover, the nuclear-weapon States had disregarded the four objectives stated in the preamble to the Treaty, namely to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, to facilitate the cessation of the production and manufacture of nuclear weapons and ensure the liquidation of all existing stockpiles and, lastly, to ensure the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Those States had not provided any adequate negative or positive security assurances and had not even agreed not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

10. His delegation recognized, however, that the end of the cold war had enabled substantial progress to be made in disarmament and it welcomed the important and constructive initiatives taken by Russia and the United States in the matter of bilateral disarmament. It was also pleased to note that Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan had unilaterally decided to abandon their nuclear programme, thus showing that a country could renounce the possession of nuclear weapons without losing in stature or security.

11. Since the fourth review conference in 1990, more than 30 States, including two nuclear-weapon States, France and China, as well as Algeria and several other countries, had acceded to the Treaty, so that there were now very few States that had not yet signed it. His delegation thought that, in deciding to accede to the Treaty and dismantle its stock of nuclear weapons, South Africa had taken a courageous, constructive and crucial decision that should be imitated by Israel, which had so far expressed no intention of acceding to the Treaty and was even refusing to recognize the existence of nuclear weapons in

its territory. That attitude was particularly disturbing as, for some years, positive developments had been noted with regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones in Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific. Moreover, at the next Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, the African States were expected to proclaim the denuclearization of Africa.

12. Efforts to establish the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and, in particular, alternative solutions and new means and methods advocated, continued to give rise to differences of opinion and certain reservations. His delegation hoped that measures would be taken to enable those efforts to succeed, and thought that the two States that were permanent members of the Security Council, and whose fleets maintained the largest presence in the waters of the Indian Ocean, should participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean.

13. On the other hand, the plan to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was still making no headway. In fact, despite the changes that had occurred on the international scene and the peace process that was going on in the Middle East, the many efforts made to establish such a zone had met with a major obstacle, namely the Israeli nuclear-weapons programme. His delegation therefore called on the international community to take practical and effective measures to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the region and to press Israel to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty and agree to open its installations to inspection by the IAEA. There should also be a complete ban on nuclear weapons in the Middle East, all States without exception should be obliged to comply with the provisions of the Treaty and no State whatsoever should be allowed to stand apart and deliberately remain outside the nuclear non-proliferation regime. On that point, Yemen felt that the right to security assurances was a legitimate right of the non-nuclear-weapon States and that it should not be subject to any conditions or restrictions. Furthermore, his country agreed with the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement that such assurances should be embodied in a binding international treaty, whose content and provisions could be the subject of negotiations, and which should include complete safety guarantees and clear and explicit commitments taking due account of the security concerns of the developing countries, in view of the serious imbalance which still existed between the rights and obligations of States which, like Israel, were engaged in clandestine nuclear activities and refusing to accede to the Treaty, and those accorded to other countries, such as the Arab countries, which had voluntarily renounced the nuclear option.

14. Although it contained a number of positive aspects, Security Council resolution 984 (1995) of 11 April 1995 did not give the non-nuclear-weapon States the assurances to which they should be entitled under a binding multilateral international treaty. To begin with it did not recognize that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons constituted a grave threat to international peace and security. Furthermore, the Security Council did not undertake either to take effective collective measures to remove the threats to the peace or to take retaliatory measures against the perpetrators of aggression or those who jeopardized the peace.

15. Development and strengthening of international cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was one of the Treaty's main objectives. It was important to give IAEA, which thus far had been unable to play a full role

in that area, the means it needed in order to help the developing countries develop peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

16. Maintenance and continuity of the Treaty were two essential conditions for solving the fundamental problems which had prompted adoption of the Treaty 25 years earlier. States parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, must have the political will to fulfil all the commitments and obligations they had contracted under article VI. Those States were legally and morally bound to strengthen the Treaty and the regime stemming therefrom in order to achieve complete disarmament. Adoption by agreement of a reasonable and balanced solution would satisfy the vast majority of States parties, strengthen the non-proliferation regime, improve international relations, contribute to the maintenance of peace and security and promote coexistence among States. In order to do so the best thing would be to adopt a formula that would provide for an extension and guarantee, in the near future, implementation of the provisions and conditions of the Treaty and its universality, elicit the support of all, take into account the legitimate rights and concerns of the States parties and be consistent with the spirit of article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty.

17. Finally his delegation resolutely supported the positions and viewpoints expressed by the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement regarding disarmament and the achievement of the goals and objectives of the Treaty, and it hoped that the Conference would be in a position to adopt a final document that would make the Treaty an effective instrument in the service of peace and security.

18. Mr. KENDALL (Marshall Islands) said that his country was a young State and had acceded to the Treaty only on 30 January 1995. Between 1946 and 1958, the United States had tested 66 atomic weapons in the Marshall Islands. The results of that massive nuclear testing had been devastating to the health of the inhabitants; of all the countries in the Pacific Ocean the Marshall Islands remained the most severely affected by radioactive contamination.

19. As a matter of principle, the Marshall Islands were in favour of general disarmament, both conventional and nuclear, and the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It welcomed the existing moratorium and the statement made by the representative of China in support of such a test ban. The Treaty was an integral building block of the whole regime of nuclear disarmament and international security. While recognizing the need for an indefinite extension of the Treaty, the Marshall Islands could understand the concerns expressed by some countries in regard to the strengthening of certain conditions.

20. The Marshall Islands unreservedly supported the statement made at the conclusion of the meeting of the Security Council, held at the level of Heads of State and Government on 31 January 1992, to the effect that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security. However, the permanent members of the Council had a special responsibility, particularly from a financial point of view, for tackling that problem. They must also reduce their nuclear arsenals in a safe, controlled and verifiable manner. His delegation believed, as did the delegation of the Netherlands, that the Treaty placed a heavy moral responsibility on the nuclear-weapon States, one which they were duty-bound to fulfil.

21. His delegation agreed with the German delegation that the production of weapons-grade fissionable material must be stopped. The German proposal for an international plutonium regime was most interesting. He also welcomed the United Kingdom's announcement that it would unilaterally cease production of such material, and hoped that that effort would be supported by all the members of the Nuclear Suppliers' Group.

22. His delegation also agreed that the safeguards regime of IAEA needed to be further strengthened, and it paid tribute to the Agency and to its Director General for their excellent work.

23. Like many other delegations, his delegation was very concerned at the potential for so-called "horizontal" proliferation. It appealed, on the one hand, to the countries which were on the threshold of becoming nuclear-weapon States, to follow the example set by South Africa and, on the other hand, to the States which had not signed the Treaty, to adhere to the Treaty and to the safeguards currently provided and to work for a comprehensive improvement in the regime, particularly article VI.

24. His Government's main concern was the lack of safe radioactive waste disposal sites anywhere in the world and the fact that so little attention was given to disposal of the waste resulting from the dismantling of civilian reactors and military weapons, let alone the nuclear decontamination of the islands in the Pacific. The present Conference should review article IV, paragraph 2, with a view to finding a way to help clean up radioactive contamination around the globe. The exchange of scientific and technological information provided for in the Treaty did not, strictly speaking, include decontamination efforts. As his delegation had suggested at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, the international community should mobilize resources in order to study the feasibility of setting up an international waste disposal site. Such a step would be in keeping with the goals of the Treaty.

25. His delegation therefore fully supported the indefinite extension of the Treaty, but it would like to see more work done in the following areas: strengthening of the IAEA safeguards regime; preparation of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty; cessation of the production of fissionable nuclear materials and enhanced disarmament measures to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States with further assurances to be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States.

26. Mr. RAHMAN (Bangladesh) said that his country unequivocally supported the continuance, consolidation and progressive development of the Treaty. Bangladesh was constitutionally committed to working for renunciation of the use of force and general and complete disarmament, and considered the Treaty the most effective existing mechanism to that end.

27. The Treaty provided two critical balances. First of all, review and extension of the Treaty were inextricably linked. They could not be dealt with separately. Inasmuch as all speakers had underscored the unequal and imperfect nature of the Treaty, it was essential to strengthen the review process.

28. The second balance was the linkage between non-proliferation and disarmament. In that connection, the Conference offered a historic opportunity.

The Treaty was not an end in itself but a means of moving towards averting the dangers of nuclear war and safeguarding the security of all people. The fact that it was the most widely adhered to arms control treaty and that States continued to accede to it up to the present attested to its credibility and continued relevance.

29. The fact that the non-proliferation Treaty had in the first instance been adopted for a limited duration had not been the result of a North-South conflict. Notwithstanding the security of the nuclear umbrella, some important States of the North had had reservations about renouncing nuclear weapons for all time and a trial period of 25 years had been established to enable States parties to take an informed decision about the future of the Treaty. In that connection, he said he believed that the Conference had met not to decide whether to extend the Treaty but to decide on the best means of extending it in accordance with article X, paragraph 2.

30. The major success of the Treaty had been to arrest horizontal proliferation; as in 1970, there were still only five declared nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty had established a moral norm, as evidenced by South Africa's voluntary renunciation of the nuclear option and its accession to the Treaty, together with Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus, all as non-nuclear-weapon States.

31. The results achieved in vertical non-proliferation were much more disappointing. The objective of the Treaty had not been to codify or legitimize inequality. His delegation agreed with many others that article VI of the Treaty and the preambular paragraphs relating thereto obligated the nuclear-weapon States to pursue negotiations in good faith with a view to the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, a cut-off convention prohibiting the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes, and an instrument prohibiting the first use of nuclear weapons. Those steps should lead to further negotiations on deep reductions in nuclear weapons, with the ultimate aim of eliminating them from national arsenals.

32. The progress in disarmament achieved in recent years was welcome, but it should be borne in mind that, according to reliable estimates, even after the START II Treaty had been implemented, the nuclear forces of the nuclear Powers would still exceed the level they had been in 1970 when the non-proliferation Treaty had entered into force. Bangladesh believed, however, that, with the end of the cold war, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence should be disavowed and it found disconcerting reports that some countries were allocating to their nuclear-weapons programmes, and in particular to research in that field, funds which were far in excess of those which they were allocating to the dismantling of their arsenals. While long and complex negotiations might well be required to draw up a schedule for nuclear disarmament, the nuclear Powers could, at the present stage, reassure the non-nuclear-weapon States parties by reaffirming that nuclear disarmament was their ultimate goal.

33. Bangladesh welcomed the progress made by the Conference on Disarmament with regard to the elaboration of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and it hoped that agreement would soon be reached on a universal and effectively verifiable instrument. It also hoped that techniques which were not directly covered by such a treaty would not be used for the development of nuclear weapon systems. It was also pleased to note that the Conference on Disarmament was

working on the preparation of a cut-off convention to prohibit the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes and, in that connection, it believed that the issue of existing stockpiles should also be addressed.

34. With regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones, he welcomed the Treaties of Tlatelolco and of Rarotonga and the progress made towards the denuclearization of Africa. Bangladesh, which believed that nuclear-weapon-free zones promoted non-proliferation and strengthened confidence, regularly sponsored General Assembly resolutions calling for the establishment of such a zone in South Asia.

35. The question of security assurances did not fall strictly within the purview of the non-proliferation Treaty. Such assurances were, however, essential to the effectiveness of the Treaty and should ideally have been incorporated into it. Resolution 984 (1995), which had been adopted unanimously by the Security Council on the eve of the Conference, had, however, marked some progress, particularly with regard to negative security assurances. Nevertheless, it still fell short of a legally binding international instrument enjoying the same status as the non-proliferation Treaty which would offer cast-iron guarantees in the event of an attack or threat of an attack by nuclear weapons.

36. With reference to article IV, he said that the non-aligned countries called for all States parties to have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, without discrimination. That was all the more important in that some States which were not parties to the non-proliferation Treaty appeared to have benefited more from international trade in nuclear material and equipment than other non-nuclear-weapon States which were parties to the Treaty. In that connection, it was his country's expectation that the Nuclear Suppliers Group would operate in a transparent manner and that arbitrary and discriminatory restraints would not be imposed on peaceful nuclear trade.

37. With regard to the safeguards system, the Gulf War had demonstrated the weakness of the system, namely that it was applied only to declared nuclear installations. IAEA had no independent sources of information and it was therefore difficult for it to detect undeclared materials or installations. The non-aligned countries had urged that all nuclear activities and installations should be placed under comprehensive and strengthened IAEA safeguards. In that connection, it would be helpful if IAEA were to be given greater access to information and sites of interest to it.

38. The non-proliferation Treaty was not a perfect instrument, but it had served an admirable purpose during times of great tension. If the procedure for its amendment were not so complex, it would be tempting to adjust it for a transitional period of 25 years. Since that was not a feasible option, the Conference must endeavour to strengthen confidence in the Treaty and promote its objectives.

39. Very cogent arguments had been advanced in favour of both indefinite extension and extension for additional fixed periods. The debate focused on ways of promoting the universality of the Treaty, disarmament, confidence and predictability. Some also wondered whether there might be a viable alternative to the Treaty, which remained the only multilateral legal instrument binding States to conduct negotiations with a view to nuclear disarmament. Some

non-nuclear-weapon States parties were afraid of forfeiting their leverage to promote nuclear disarmament if the Treaty were to be extended indefinitely and unconditionally. In conclusion, he emphasized that, in view of the vital importance of the Treaty for all States parties, the Conference should make every effort to reach a decision by consensus.

40. Mr. Taylhardat (Venezuela), Vice-President, took the Chair.

41. Mr. SAMANA (Papua New Guinea) said that his delegation fully subscribed to the remarks made recently by the representative of Indonesia, to the effect that the unconditional and indefinite extension of the non-proliferation Treaty would be tantamount to the legitimization of the possession of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. That was contrary to the objective of the Treaty, which was to achieve total nuclear disarmament.

42. A realistic analysis of the way in which the Treaty had been implemented showed that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had failed to meet the obligations they had undertaken under article VI of the Treaty, namely to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. That was why the Treaty had been unable to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons - it had only been able to control horizontal proliferation - and had instead facilitated the centralization of the control, possession and qualitative development of nuclear weapons by a very small number of nuclear-weapon States. Papua New Guinea also believed that the bilateral efforts made by the United States and the former Soviet Union - now the Russian Federation - to reduce their nuclear arsenals were the result of detente between the two countries rather than of the vigorous implementation of the Treaty by all nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. It therefore called for the immediate implementation of the following measures: the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty; the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes; further reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation, and the inclusion of China, France and the United Kingdom as parties to the START treaty to which such reductions would give rise; the standardization of nuclear export policies and the incorporation in the Treaty of provisions providing for sanctions in the event of violations of the established standards; the conclusion of a treaty containing positive security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States; and the concerted efforts to strengthen security safeguards, which meant the strengthening of the resources available to IAEA and transparency in its operations.

43. Extending the Treaty for a series of fixed periods would provide a dynamic environment within which clear and verifiable targets could be negotiated for the reduction of nuclear weapons, and would facilitate gradual achievement of all the objectives of the Treaty. That would not in any way undermine the permanence or the continuity of the Treaty. While Papua New Guinea supported the NPT as the only existing instrument for non-proliferation, it believed that the Treaty must reflect the goal of establishing global norms that were binding on all States parties. Unilateral decisions of nuclear-weapon States in the absence of a legally binding international treaty afforded no guarantee for the security of other States, big or small. Papua New Guinea also believed that the goal of the NPT should be not only non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, but

also the total eradication of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction. That was why it had taken an active part in sponsoring and voting for the World Health Organization (WHO) resolution requesting the International Court of Justice to consider the possibility of declaring any threat or use of nuclear weapons illegal. Papua New Guinea took the view that the Treaty in its current form legalized the possession of nuclear weapons by a small number of States - thus polarizing States into nuclear "haves" and "have nots" - a condition which might continue to fuel proliferation and the qualitative development of nuclear weapons. The major nuclear-weapon States had not denounced their policies of nuclear deterrence, and continued to impede progress towards non-proliferation, inhibiting the desire of the international community to establish lasting global peace and security.

44. The Pacific countries continued to suffer from atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons and the dumping of nuclear wastes. It was well known that the health problems and environmental degradation caused by such activities had resulted in the uprooting of some of the Pacific communities. The Pacific countries believed that the continuous nuclear testing in their waters directly contravened their most fundamental rights, and therefore called on the international community to guarantee their environmental security without delay, realistically and resolutely, within an internationally and legally binding treaty with the necessary safeguards and assurances.

45. The Pacific Island region had been a pioneer in establishing a nuclear-free zone, demonstrating its commitment to meet the obligations of the Treaty. The Pacific countries were encouraged by other regional initiatives, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and by initiatives to establish nuclear-free zones in Africa, South-East Asia and the Middle East. It was disheartening, however, that certain nuclear-weapon States which had a direct influence in the South Pacific region had failed to sign the Protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga, and were not making every effort to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. In that respect, the Pacific countries fully appreciated the positive decision by China and Russia to sign the Treaty of Rarotonga and accede to the relevant Protocols. They hoped that others would follow suit immediately.

46. While his delegation would very much welcome a strengthening of the NPT regime to meet the immediate objectives of nuclear non-proliferation, the lack of security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly for the protection of their environment, made it extremely difficult for it to vote for an indefinite extension.

47. Mr. CHEIKH SYLLA (Senegal) said that the NPT had had somewhat mixed results. The determination of the parties, referred to in the eleventh preambular paragraph, to discontinue all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time had not led to specific commitments or, more important, binding commitments. While it was true that most of the nuclear Powers had voluntarily suspended testing, a comprehensive test-ban treaty remained elusive, despite constant appeals by Senegal and other countries. Likewise, with regard to the intention, stated in the preamble, to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all existing stockpiles, and the elimination of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery, the disappearance of the old bipolar system had encouraged significant progress.

But it had to be admitted that that threefold objective was far from being achieved.

48. Another area where much had been expected concerned the promotion of access by the non-nuclear-weapon States to the technology and applications of nuclear energy for economic and social progress. The opportunities offered by the use of nuclear energy in agriculture, medicine and industry, for example, made that aspect of the NPT regime second to none, especially as far as the developing countries were concerned. Yet, despite the generous provisions of articles IV and V of the Treaty, the measures taken were inadequate for the most part. No doubt commendable efforts were being made by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with regard to the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, but the initiatives in that area, as in others, had been largely inadequate. For example, for over 10 years there had been regular reductions in the resources of the technical cooperation fund on which the Agency's activities related to the transfer of nuclear energy were based, because of the shortage of donor contributions. The allocation of a tiny portion of the peace dividend to that cooperation fund would go a long way towards redressing the situation and would enhance the credibility of the non-proliferation regime.

49. Senegal attached great importance to the establishment of nuclear-free zones. They should be established with the express collaboration of the nuclear Powers, for it was their role to guarantee respect for the status of such zones and to provide the participating States with the required security guarantees. The African countries were working on a draft treaty to make Africa a nuclear-free zone; they would very much like the nuclear Powers to undertake commitments in that regard when the drafting was completed.

50. Demands for negative security guarantees had been made over and over again but had not yet been met. Though the question had been under lengthy discussion since the Treaty had been negotiated, it was not really so complicated. There was nothing more natural than for States that had voluntarily renounced the option of possessing nuclear weapons to request firm assurances against the threat or use of such weapons. To date, however, no satisfactory solution had been found. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) undoubtedly represented progress towards a solution, but much more was needed: precise and binding legal commitments were called for. Negative security guarantees were indispensable if an equitable and properly balanced non-proliferation regime was to be promoted.

51. It was clear therefore that there were gaps, inadequacies and imbalances both in the conception and the implementation of the Treaty. The Conference should not therefore restrict itself to the question of the extension of the Treaty; it should also provide an opportunity of reaffirming the objectives of nuclear disarmament, of consolidating the achievements in that field and of filling the gaps that might prejudice the maintenance of the Treaty's authority. Indeed, in spite of its gaps, inadequacies and imbalances, the Treaty was a basic contribution to the maintenance of peace and security throughout the world. In proscribing dissemination of nuclear weapons on a large scale, the Treaty was a key to the security of all countries. That contribution was more significant than all the inadequacies that could be found in the Treaty's structure and in the implementation of its provisions. For that reason, Senegal, which had always called for general, complete and verifiable

disarmament and which had begun for several years to work alongside the African countries in preparing a treaty which would banish nuclear weapons from Africa, supported the option of an unlimited extension of the Treaty.

52. Mr. VELLISTE (Estonia) said that his country associated itself with the statement made by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union and the Eastern and Central European States associated with the Union. In the post-cold war world, it was clear that the ability to carry out nuclear war was no longer an acceptable measure of a nation's political, economic or security strength. Only through global stability brought about by disarmament would peace and sustainable human development be possible.

53. Estonia supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Non-use of nuclear weapons was a starting-point. All countries must agree that real efforts aimed at reduction of nuclear weapons would lessen the chances of nuclear accidents, blackmail and war. The Conference provided an unprecedented opportunity to support and continue the diverse efforts that had already been started in the field of disarmament. Estonia would like to see the acceptance of a comprehensive test-ban treaty before the end of the year and an eventual ban on the production of fissionable material for military purposes. It was hard to imagine that multilateral, regional, bilateral or unilateral disarmament activities would effectively continue unless the Treaty was unconditionally accepted.

54. Estonia supported the review process already embodied in the Treaty. Safeguard mechanisms such as nuclear-free zones and the verification work begun by IAEA were of particular importance for the implementation of the Treaty. Estonia would like to see the continuation of a dynamic NPT that would not have to be renegotiated at any particular time in the future and would be comprehensive enough to include means through which new circumstances could be addressed.

55. In Security Council resolution 984 (1995) the permanent members recognized the concerns of non-nuclear States. The resolution was an important step forward in ensuring acceptance of the NPT provisions by all Member States because it provided a framework for more concrete and binding security assurances. It was important for Estonia that the Security Council had affirmed a collective role for the United Nations that emphasized confidence-building through security assurances, transparency and cooperation in areas of disarmament, and conflict resolution.

56. In pursuit of global disarmament and regional security, Estonia would continue seeking to cooperate with various existing and international organizations and alliances that had shown a commitment to stability and the responsible management of nuclear materials.

57. Estonia attached importance to the dismantling and transport, as well as the short-term and permanent storage procedures, used in regard to nuclear weapons and nuclear materials. The issue of smuggling nuclear materials through Estonia was being addressed. The environmental concerns related to the peacetime uses of nuclear energy at nearby plants and the conversion of military facilities that contained nuclear weapons to peacetime uses were of particular importance.

58. Estonia supported detailed accounting for fissionable materials and export controls.

59. Universal accession to the Treaty would reduce the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. The rule of law must prevail over a lawless situation based on the threat of total annihilation.

60. There was no doubt that international peace and security would be enhanced through discussions that led to disarmament and to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Estonia thanked and congratulated all the States that had taken part in article VI negotiations. Estonia believed that the Conference could genuinely contribute to world peace through creating confidence, stability and victory for common sense.

61. Mr. Dhanapala (Sri Lanka) took the Chair.

62. Mrs. des ILES (Trinidad and Tobago) said that her country was a firm supporter of nuclear non-proliferation. It had signed the non-proliferation Treaty. The attainment of universal adherence would undoubtedly further strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contribute to enhanced regional and international security and stability. She therefore expressed the hope that States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty would soon do so.

63. Her delegation was encouraged by the recently held negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The completion of such a treaty by 1996 would demonstrate the degree of commitment of the nuclear-weapon States to the fulfilment of their obligations under article VI. Agreement on a universal treaty which was internationally and effectively verifiable and which would ban testing in all environments would constitute a key step forward in the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

64. Trinidad and Tobago shared the concerns expressed by the Non-Aligned States for legally binding positive and negative security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties and for the conclusion of a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissionable material for nuclear weapons that was non-discriminatory. Recent efforts to enhance security assurances through statements made by the nuclear-power States and the unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) were timely.

65. Trinidad and Tobago, as a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, supported the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which underlined the importance that regional organizations and arrangements could play in promoting and maintaining international peace and security. The fact that all the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean had not become parties to the Treaty of Tlatelolco demonstrated their commitment to a nuclear-weapon-free world. Her delegation also welcomed the proposal which had been put forward for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia and the Middle East and the finalization of the draft treaty for an African nuclear-weapon-free zone.

66. She was of the view that the objective of general and complete disarmament should be supported by a permanent legal instrument. Trinidad and Tobago therefore supported the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

67. The process of nuclear disarmament was not devoid of challenges, with the increasing need to store the components of nuclear weapons securely, especially enriched uranium and plutonium which required numerous logistic, administrative, legislative, technical and safety arrangements that must be urgently addressed. The smuggling of radioactive material also posed serious potential threats to the international community.

68. Trinidad and Tobago, together with other developing countries, placed importance on the link between disarmament and development, and had always believed that a reduction in arms expenditure should liberate funds for economic and social development. The recent World Summit for Social Development had again brought to the fore the importance of the security of the individual for international peace and security and the urgency with which the international community must address developmental needs.

69. As Chairman of the Alliance of Small Island States, she wished to state, on behalf of the members of the Alliance which were States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, that they considered it legitimate and opportune to use the current Conference to express their concerns regarding the potentially catastrophic effects of the marine transport of irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and highly radioactive wastes. The Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States had identified pollution prevention and the transboundary movement of hazardous materials as critical issues for such States. It would be impossible for them to respond effectively to possible accidents, which had a long-lasting impact on people's health and the economy. That was why the members of the Alliance which were parties to the Treaty called upon shipment countries to respect the wishes of the Governments and peoples of small island developing States, which had called for an end to shipments of irradiated fuel, plutonium and other radioactive wastes through their archipelagic and territorial waters as well as their exclusive economic zones. They also believed that there was an urgent need for a comprehensive environmental impact assessment regarding the marine transport of such materials, and for improvement of the international safety regime governing such shipments. Members of the Alliance which were parties to the Treaty were also of the view that any future transport of those materials through the oceans should be based on the strict liability of shipment countries for full compensation for the recovery of lost consignments and for any resulting damage.

70. Mr. BOISSON (Monaco) said that his country, a small State which had no nuclear weapons and no army, attached great importance to the undertakings given by the large States and the nuclear Powers, and particularly to resolution 984 (1995) recently adopted by the Security Council. It considered that all those undertakings were reassuring both for the present and for the future. It also considered encouraging the conclusion of the START I and II Treaties, as well as the efforts made by the major nuclear Powers to reduce their arsenals, emphasizing that the process could be described as irreversible.

71. He noted that the 178 States which had acceded so far to the Treaty were clear proof of their confidence in the safeguards offered by the Treaty and in the results already achieved during the past 25 years. Accordingly, by his recent decision to ratify the Treaty, his Highness the Prince of Monaco had also

wanted to demonstrate his confidence and to associate himself with the struggle against the nuclear scourge.

72. His delegation had given much consideration to the statements of preceding speakers concerning the technical or political aspects of the question, but wished to emphasize the philosophy and the humanist aspirations which had inspired the drafters of the Treaty. No one could remain indifferent to the issue of nuclear disarmament, since nuclear weapons recognized neither the frontiers nor the size of States. The Principality of Monaco, which had neither arms nor army, had devoted its modest resources to its economic, social and cultural development, and he noted that the vast majority of States Members of the United Nations had also chosen not to possess or transfer nuclear weapons or to facilitate an expansion of the nuclear threat. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the conclusion of regional agreements banning the use of nuclear weapons, and warmly welcomed the new South Africa and Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, which had decided to renounce their nuclear weapons or to reduce them considerably.

73. His delegation had noted with great interest the reports prepared by IAEA concerning its activities pursuant to the Treaty, and had listened with satisfaction to the statement by the Director General of the Agency and welcomed his conclusions. His delegation also welcomed the rigorous action taken by IAEA in the context of its responsibilities under the Treaty, and described the Agency as an instrument that could undoubtedly be improved but was none the less irreplaceable. Furthermore, it commended the very high level of competence of the IAEA laboratory for marine radioactivity in Monaco and considered that the Agency provided a guarantee of scientific competence and political neutrality which could not but encourage States to ensure the perpetuity of the Treaty.

74. In conclusion, he said that the unconditional and indefinite extension of the Treaty, under conditions of transparency and openness which would leave no doubts as to the genuine intentions of the greatest number of States, seemed the most equitable solution and above all the one most in keeping with his country's conception of the spirit and letter of the Treaty, and he invited all States to choose that option. He also stressed that Monaco fully endorsed the statement made by the representative of France on behalf of the European Union and the words of the representative of Côte d'Ivoire, who had so eloquently appealed to nations to foster a universal culture of peace.

75. Mr. KIM (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply to delegations other than the delegation of the Republic of Korea which had cast aspersions on his country during the general debate, emphasized that the nuclear question in the Korean peninsula was a glaring example of the shortcomings of the non-proliferation Treaty. The most serious problem lay in the implementation of the Treaty. The influential States parties took advantage of its discriminatory nature to divide States at their whim into "friendly" States and "enemy" or "evil" States, which amounted to applying double standards in the implementation of the Treaty. Moreover, the nuclear question in the Korean peninsula had originated from the introduction by the United States of nuclear weapons into South Korean territory. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was a small, non-aligned country without nuclear weapons which, having concluded a cease-fire and not a definitive peace agreement, lived under the constant threat of such weapons. That was why, in

the desire to guard against such a threat, it had acceded to the Treaty in the belief that that instrument could protect it. However, that had not been the case at all, and the threat against it persisted. Its numerous appeals to the international community calling attention to its plight had fallen on deaf ears. In addition, feeling that it was useless to remain bound by a Treaty which was of no benefit to it, it had decided to withdraw from the Treaty, a measure which it had subsequently suspended in the light of the "Agreed Framework" it had concluded with the United States. In that regard, he pointed out that those who were currently denigrating his country had never asked the question whether it was threatened by a nuclear attack and whether that was a violation of the Treaty. Such indifference was the fruit of biased minds which had sought from the outset to categorize the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as an enemy State and to portray it as an evil country.

76. He emphasized that the Korean nuclear question was a political and military issue which must be settled by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States; the solution must not be entrusted to IAEA, which was a technical organization manipulated by certain influential States. He pointed out that, having already had the aide-mémoire of his country's Atomic Energy Commission circulated to the participants in the Conference, his delegation would not respond in detail to the statement by the Director General of IAEA. But it was ridiculous for the Director General to have called for special inspections of two military bases which he had already inspected himself. He also wished to point out that the States members of IAEA had already rejected the idea of utilizing satellite-imaging techniques, fearing that such procedures might infringe their sovereignty. All that scheming stemmed from a desire to use the Treaty and IAEA as a means of isolating and strangling the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the political, military and economic fields. The 25 years of operation of the Treaty created the impression that a number of influential States had taken over the non-proliferation Treaty, fashioning it and IAEA into instruments which they sought to use for controlling and dominating most non-nuclear-weapon States. So long as the States parties were divided into friendly and enemy or evil States, and so long as some of them were the subject of discriminatory treatment, the non-proliferation regime could never be strengthened, even if extended for an indefinite period.

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.